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Patterns and Correlates of Dissatisfaction with Government Performance in the Gauteng City-Region, South Africa: A Comparison across Three Government Spheres*

Koech Cheruiyot, Samy Katumba, and Chris Wray

Gauteng City-Region Observatory, South Africa

Abstract: With an increasing focus on the need to enhance government performance across the world, this paper explores dissatisfaction with the performance of three spheres of government in the Gauteng City-Region (GCR), South Africa. This paper uses the 2013 Quality of Life (QoL) survey data to examine spatial patterns and correlates of dissatisfaction with government performance as well as whether significant correlates that explain dissatisfaction with government performance vary across the three spheres of government. Results show significant spatial clustering in the levels of dissatisfaction across all three spheres of government, with more significant clustering in the local sphere, followed by the provincial and national spheres. The central core of Gauteng exhibits the lowest levels of dissatisfaction, whilst a clustering of high levels of dissatisfaction occurs in the southern areas. While spatial analysis revealed variation in the correlates across the three spheres, common correlates were also discernible. These include: the percentage of respondents dissatisfied with their dwelling, average sense of safety, average score access to services, percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, and percentage of respondents who agree that the country is going in the wrong direction. The disjuncture between perceptions of government performance and satisfaction with services is evident in this paper's results.

JEL Codes: F43, R15, R12

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1. INTRODUCTION

There is a worldwide focus on the need to enhance government performance characterized by increasing demands on public expenditure, higher quality services, and in some cases,

*Cheruiyot, Katumba, Wray are Senior Researcher, Researcher, and Senior Systems Analyst, respectively, at Gauteng City-Region Observatory: a partnership between the University of the Witwatersrand, University of Johannesburg, Gauteng Provincial Government, and organized local government. *Address:* Private Bag 3, Wits 2050. *Corresponding Author:* K. Cheruiyot, E-mail: kenneth.cheruiyot@gcro.ac.za

Figure 1: Gauteng City-Region

an unwillingness to pay higher taxes (Curristine, 2005). In South Africa in general and the Gauteng City-Region (GCR) in particular, there are rising service delivery protests and increasing levels of dissatisfaction with government performance, despite a massive rollout of basic services since the fall of apartheid in the early 1990s.¹ The Municipal IQ Hotspots Monitor Database, which records major community protests staged against a municipality as documented either by the media or other sources in the public domain, reported a record number of service delivery protests in 2014, 185 from January to November, with the province of Gauteng recording the most protests (Municipal IQ, 2014). These findings correlate with the civic protest barometer which reflected an all-time-high of 218 protests in 2014 (Powell et al., 2015).

According to the National Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) (2013), “the experiences of citizens - the intended beneficiaries of government services - are a critical component of measuring the performance of government and for the delivery of appropriate and quality services.” Citizen-satisfaction surveys that measure citizens’ experiences of government are useful for analyzing and revealing spatial variations with the dissatisfaction in terms of the quality of government services (Kelly and Swindell, 2002b). The 2013 Quality of Life (QoL) survey² (as a citizen-based survey) provides useful insights

¹The Gauteng City-Region, with the province of Gauteng as its core, is an integrated cluster of cities, towns, and urban nodes that together make up the economic heartland of South Africa (see Figure 1).

²Since 2009, QoL surveys have been undertaken biennially in Gauteng by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO). The 2013 QoL survey interviewed 27,490 respondents (GCRO, 2015). See Jennings (2012)

into residents' opinions of government performance and the delivery of services within the GCR, the study area (see Figure 1).

The increasing dissatisfaction reflected in the QoL survey contrast with an apparent increase in satisfaction with government-provided services (GCRO, 2015).³ Clearly, satisfaction with government-provided services does not directly equate to satisfaction with the performance of government. There are other dynamics or issues that may explain the poor opinion of government performance, and there is an urgent need for government to gain a better understanding of the dissatisfaction with government performance expressed by the residents of the GCR.

Utilizing the 2013 QoL survey data, geocoded at the point of interview with ward-level representative data available for all the municipalities, this paper employs a spatial statistical analysis at the ward-level to explore dissatisfaction with the performance of government at the local, provincial, and national spheres. The research addresses the following questions: i) Is there a spatial pattern in the dissatisfaction with the performance of government responses from the 2013 QoL survey in each of the three government spheres?; ii) What significant correlates may explain the patterns of dissatisfaction with each of the government spheres?; and iii) Do the factors that explain dissatisfaction with government performance vary across the three spheres of government?

The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, a review of relevant literature is covered in the second section. The section also reviews government performance in South Africa and Gauteng. Section three describes the data and methods used, while results are presented and discussed in section four. Section five concludes the paper.

2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Why Study Government Performance?

With government performance defined as "the yield or results of activities carried out in relation to the purposes being pursued" (Curristine, 2005), studies on evaluating government performance dates back to the latter part of the 19th century, where as a result of pervasiveness of patronage and corruption, the need to hold workers accountable for their actions was apparent in the United States of America (de Lancer Julnes, 2006). This led to an emphasis on managerial efficiency that prioritized financial accountability. Further loss of trust in government's abilities and cynicism on government's financial accountability led to the agitation for the minimum role of government in delivering public services. The latter was achieved through privatization on the assumption that the private sector would do well where the public sector failed (de Lancer Julnes, 2006). de Lancer Julnes (2006) adds that actions to hold government accountable have not been limited to the U.S., New Zealand and Australia are cited as examples where innovations aimed at holding governments accountable

for a summary of citizen-based surveys completed by various government spheres and departments from 2008 to 2010.

³The 14 government-provided services are: dwelling, water, sanitation, waste removal, energy, street lights, roads, storm water, municipal billing, cost of municipal service, libraries, public health, education, and public safety and security.

have led to a more responsive, innovative public sector delivering better services as well as an increase in efficiency, improved financial accountability, and improved overall fiscal control.

Measuring government performance and accountability has not been limited to internal government performance measurements. Citizens have been recognized as equally important in shaping the quality and responsiveness of government programs in their community. Citizen participation is also seen as important in increasing legitimacy and trust in government (Kelly and Swindell, 2002a; de Lancer Julnes, 2006). However, the methods and the data used in assessing government performance have been the subject of debates in the literature. Internal performance (also called objective) measures are usually "outcomes" oriented and are based on "hard indicators," such as the monetary cost incurred delivering a given service to citizens. These (internal) measures often fail to take into account citizens' responses to and satisfaction with the services provided. Conversely, citizen satisfaction surveys (also referred to as external or subjective measures) are subjective and based on individual or public opinions, providing an indication of how citizens perceive the services that government provides.

Van Ryzin (2007) presented a conceptual framework for understanding the relationships among government performance, citizen satisfaction, and trust. Van Ryzin (2007) also noted that government-performance measures may be influenced by external factors, such as the economy and social trends, while citizen-based perception measures may be influenced by the social context of the citizens, the media, individual background characteristics, and political tendency. Some studies, such as Brown and Coulter (1983), found no existing link between the quantity and quality of service and the levels of citizen satisfaction with the provided service. Other studies, such as Kelly and Swindell (2002a), found some correlations between government performance measures (internal) and citizen-based performance measures (external) in the levels of citizen satisfaction with government-provided services. Elsewhere, Kelly and Swindell (2002b) suggested that disaggregating citizen-satisfaction surveys according to geographic neighborhood area locations may reveal granular, heterogeneous results across an otherwise homogenous cityscape.

Our work improves on the literature by using ward-level data in a city-region and employing spatial econometrics techniques. Similarly, the scarce literature focusing on developing countries, more so, a developing country like South Africa with inherent and entrenched inequalities, implies that our work is a useful addition to the literature. In addition, the short time (since 1994) that the country has been democratic makes it a unique case study worth examining with regard to the perceptions of people not only on the role of government, but more so, on what actually government can provide. We also emphasize that spatial models are useful in capturing and depicting granular, heterogeneous patterns in an otherwise homogenous landscape as would be captured and depicted by traditional ordinary regression models.

2.2. Assessing Government Performance in South Africa: Research Context?

Before discussing how government performance is assessed in South Africa, it is relevant to first describe the type of governmental structures adopted in the country. South Africa's government is a three-sphere system comprised of the national government as the top sphere,

provincial government as the middle, and local government as the primary or local sphere. The national government, also referred to as the tertiary level of government and broadly responsible for state-wide policy, has the role of nationally coordinating and regulating government as a whole and setting the country's objectives (Everatt et al., 2011). The provincial government, or secondary level of government, is responsible for providing provincial deliverables through provincial departments of housing, planning, sports and transport, etc. Local government is the lower level of government that focuses on local service delivery, such as water, sanitation, street lights, waste removal, building regulations, and zoning. There are, however, overlaps and shared responsibilities across the three spheres of government, which can lead to confusion about how the responsibilities are divided, shared, and monitored (NPC, 2011).

In an effort to ensure they are adequately responding to their respective mandates, the different spheres of government have established departments and systems to monitor performance. These are, however, largely dependent on government monitoring itself (DPME, 2013). National monitoring departments include the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. In August 2013, the Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships for Frontline Service Delivery Monitoring was approved in response to the lack of citizens' experience of government services reflected within the government's monitoring systems, and the lack of a systematic use of this evidence to improve performance (DPME, 2013). At the Gauteng provincial level, the Deputy Director General of Policy Coordination, Monitoring, and Evaluation within the Office of the Premier is responsible for monitoring provincial departments' performance. At the local sphere, several legislative acts govern local government performance management.⁴

Besides internal measures of performance, government also conducts citizen-based surveys at the provincial and local levels in Gauteng (Jennings, 2012). Examples include annual perception surveys by the Office of the Premier and annual customer satisfaction surveys undertaken in each of the metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng, with the City of Johannesburg, regarding the results of its surveys as "a critical tool to use in determining the perceptions of customers about the quality of service delivery" (COJ, 2015). The GCRO's biennial QoL survey, which is statistically analyzed in this paper, is also used by provincial and local governments in Gauteng to monitor performance management.

3. DATA AND METHOD

3.1. Data and Sampling Methodology

This research uses the 2013 QoL survey data. QoL data was obtained by interviewing the adult population of Gauteng (18 years and over) with a ward-level sample based on

⁴These include: The Municipal Systems Act, (Act 32 of 2000); The Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001; The Municipal Finance Management Act, (Act 53 of 2003); and The Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal Managers, 2006 (COJ, 2012)

population data from the 2011 Census (StatsSA, 2011).⁵ To achieve ward representivity, it was decided that each ward in non-metropolitan areas of the province needed to have at least 30 respondents, while each ward in the three metropolitan areas needed to have at least 60 respondents. However, by using population proportional to size (PPS), the actual sample for more densely-populated wards would often be higher. The Small Area layer (SAL) cells - typically made up of two or three Enumerator Areas (EAs), EAs being the lowest Census statistical geographical unit - were then used to guide where ward-level interviews (determined above) had to be conducted. During the entire survey, randomness and PPS was used to determine the number of interviews and the location of interviews in the SALs in each ward. Random sampling was also employed where replacement interviews were conducted. The SAL-based interviews were eventually aggregated to ward level, municipal level, and lastly, provincial level, with a total of 27,490 respondents. Ultimately, the results were weighted back to Census 2011 in terms of the key demographic variables of gender, race, and geography (for a complete explanation of sampling methodology and weighting, (see GCRO, 2015).

Our dependent variables are the level of dissatisfaction with government performance at three spheres of government - local, provincial, and national. The dependent variable is measured by the percentage of the respondents who were dissatisfied with government performance at each sphere of government, based on the responses to the question: how satisfied are you with the performance of national government, provincial government and local government? A total of 506 wards out of 508 wards in the Gauteng province, as delineated for the 2011 local (municipal) elections, are covered in the analysis.⁶

Several explanatory variables (correlates) were hypothesized as explaining the pattern and the level (as percentage) of dissatisfaction with government performance at the three spheres. The selection of the variables was guided by empirical work (Kusow et al. (1997); Kelly and Swindell (2002b); Van Ryzin et al. (2004); Everatt et al. (2011); GCRO, 2012, 2013, 2015; GPC, 2014) and represents both objective and subjective opinions of respondents. Table 1 contains the description and univariate statistics for the dependent and explanatory model variables used in the research. It should be noted that only correlates that were identified as significant from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models were considered in the computation of the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) which is described in section 3.2. The reason being, the SDM as implemented within the spatial dependence 'spdep' package of R, was very sensitive to multicollinearity.

3.2. Choice of Analytical Techniques

Diagnostic tests were carried out to explore whether employing spatial statistical techniques were appropriate to analyze the QoL survey data. Adopting the ward as the unit of analysis, the data was potentially spatially dependent and/or heterogeneous. Spatial dependence

⁵A ward is a spatial delineation of political administrative boundaries within local municipalities (see Figure 2).

⁶Two wards in the Merafong City local municipality were excluded, namely ward 74804015 (as it only had 4 respondents that were interviewed) and ward 74804019 (as it had become an island with no neighboring wards with the exclusion of ward 74804015).

Table 1: Univariate Statistics of Model Variables

Variable description	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev
Dependent variables					
Percent dissatisfied with local gov't	506	4.41	94.44	53.09	15.89
Percent dissatisfied with provincial gov't	506	5.88	80.00	48.15	13.57
Percent dissatisfied with national gov't	506	5.88	81.25	46.07	12.68
Explanatory variables					
Percent unemployed	506	0.00	69.23	29.81	15.95
Percent Black	506	4.92	100.00	76.91	28.01
Percent Colored	506	0.00	87.50	2.98	9.72
Percent Indian	506	0.00	83.82	2.33	7.87
Percent White	506	0.00	93.44	17.23	24.77
Percent living in a formal dwelling	506	0.00	100.00	83.79	18.88
Percent living in an informal dwelling	506	0.00	100.00	13.99	17.49
Percent dissatisfied with dwelling	506	0.00	80.00	22.30	16.78
Average years of education	506	7.00	14.00	10.67	1.244
Percentage no Batho Pele principles	506	21.95	100	68.14	14.33
Percent never interact with gov't officials	506	0.00	68.29	14.10	11.36
Average score access to services index	506	0.07	1.00	0.817	0.165
Average score sense of safety index	506	0.36	0.83	0.605	0.0745
Percent agree corruption main threat to democracy	506	46.30	100.00	89.82	8.48
Percent paid a bribe	506	0.00	50.00	9.31	7.84
Percent agree country in wrong direction	506	20.97	100.00	60.68	11.54
Average household income per ward	506	832	77654	9341	105
Percent participated in service delivery protest	506	0.00	27.78	4.00	4.90
Percent think crime main problem	506	0.00	64.71	19.39	12.79
Percent think foreigners main problem	506	0.00	25.40	2.23	3.58
Percent think high cost of living main problem	506	0.00	36.36	2.93	5.25
Percent think housing main problem	506	0.00	50.00	4.22	6.19
Percent think hunger main problem	506	0.00	10.00	0.48	1.39
Percent think lack of basic services main problem	506	0.00	55.91%	10.83%	9.72
Percent think lack of maintenance main problem	506	0.00	41.97	7.42	7.28
Percent think poverty main problem	506	0.00	25.00	1.77	3.03
Percent think unemployment main problem	506	0.00	73.33	24.03	16.03
Percent agree people cannot influence developments	506	0.00	71.43	31.31	12.17
Percent agree politics waste of time	506	7.69	81.25	44.31	11.29
Percent community deteriorated	506	0.00	71.43	8.39	8.67
Percent did not attend community meeting	506	11.11	100	51.09	20.15
Percentage did not contact government	506	45.45%	100%	88.15%	8.77
Percent dissatisfied with life	506	0.00	61.50	20.6	12.1

occurs where similar values (high or low) or dissimilar values (high and low) for a random variable tend to cluster in space. Spatial heterogeneity results where there is variation in relationships over space; that is, the expectation of different relationships to hold for every

Table 2: Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Spatial Dependence across Three Spheres

	Local statistics	Provincial statistics	National statistics
LM error	51.210***	57.580***	23.997***
LM lag	56.320***	68.535***	33.936***
RLM error	4.742**	2.016	0.013
RLM lag	9.852***	12.970***	9.952***
SARMA	61.062***	70.550***	33.947***

sample point in space. These spatial effects need to be accounted for in a regression model to ensure robust results. In situations where spatial dependence is present in the model and not accounted for, the regression estimates will be biased and inefficient (in the spatial lag case) and inefficient, but unbiased (in the spatial error case) (Anselin, 1988). As recommended by Anselin (2005), a row-standardized spatial Queen Contiguity (first order) weight matrix constructed between wards with contiguous borders and edges was used. The data was analyzed in R and ArcMap was used for compiling maps.

A number of spatial regression models can be used to capture spatial dependence and heterogeneity in the response variable, the explanatory variable(s), and in the error terms (residuals). These include: the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR); the Spatial Error Model (SEM); and the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). These models are in contrast with the OLS model that fails to incorporate spatial dependence or heterogeneity over space. Table 2 show helpful diagnostics in determining which spatial regression models are appropriate for estimating correlates of dissatisfaction at each of the three spheres of government. The Lagrange Multipliers for error as well as for lag tests are all statistically significant across the three spheres of government (see Table 2). However, the robust Lagrange Multipliers for lag at all three spheres of government were statistically significant, while only the robust Lagrange Multipliers for error were statistically significant at the local sphere. To avoid the pitfall of overlooking or ignoring the spatial effects in both the dependent variable and correlates simultaneously, we employ the SDM, a two-source model, as recommended (Cook et al., 2015). The SDM results, including the final list of statistically significant explanatory variables (correlates), and related discussions are reported in the analysis section.

4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

4.1. Descriptive Results and Related Discussions

Univariate statistics for the model variables are listed in Table 1. The levels of dissatisfaction with all three spheres of government (the dependent variables) were mapped at the ward-level (using choropleth maps with natural breaks) and are depicted in Figures 2, 3, and 4. As described in the Introduction, the highest levels of dissatisfaction are with the local level and this is evident in the local dissatisfaction map. Local dissatisfaction levels range from 4.4 percent to 94.4 percent, with the highest levels of dissatisfaction with local government performance occurring in Emfuleni in the south and areas such as Westonaria. There are also

Figure 2: Dissatisfaction with Local Government Performance per Ward

Figure 3: Dissatisfaction with Provincial Government Performance per Ward

Figure 4: Dissatisfaction with national government performance per ward

clusters of high dissatisfaction in Khutsong (Merafong City), Randfontein, and Krugersdorp (Mogale City) in the west; areas in and surrounding Soweto and Alexandra in the City of Johannesburg; central Germiston, Daveyton, and the Ekurhuleni/Lesedi border in the east; and Winterveldt/Hammanskraal wards in the north of the City of Tshwane. The lowest local government performance dissatisfaction levels are mainly scattered throughout the core of the GCR. A similar pattern is also evident in the provincial map with less wards in the 60 percent to 80 percent range. The dissatisfaction with national government performance map exhibits significantly lower dissatisfaction results per ward, but follows a similar spatial pattern to the local and provincial maps. In summary, examinations of the various explanatory variables maps revealed spatial correlation between them and the various dependent variables (dissatisfaction with government performance) maps.⁷

4.2. Spatial Analysis

With the confirmed spatial effects described in the previous sections, we proceed to explore and estimate the results using spatial statistical approaches. These approaches include cluster mapping and separate spatial regression models for the three spheres of government.

4.2.1. Cluster Mapping

Cluster maps (depicted in Figures 5, 6, and 7) show evidence of localized spatial clustering in the levels of dissatisfaction with government performance. In terms of dissatisfaction with

⁷We did not include explanatory variables maps because of space limitations.

Figure 5: Cluster Map of Dissatisfaction with Local Government Performance

Figure 6: Cluster Map of Dissatisfaction with Provincial Government Performance

Figure 7: Cluster Map of Dissatisfaction with National Government Performance

local government performance, wards with low levels of dissatisfaction and low dissatisfaction in the neighboring wards (low-low clusters) are depicted in dark blue and mainly occur in the central areas in the City of Johannesburg, extending up through the southern and central areas of the City of Tshwane, and south western corner of Ekurhuleni. The wards with high levels of dissatisfaction and high dissatisfaction in the neighboring wards (high-high clusters depicted in bright red) are clearly visible in a corridor in the south of Gauteng extending from Vanderbijlpark/Sebokeng area in Emfuleni to Bakkersdal in Westonaria and southern Johannesburg. There are also patches of high-high significance in Soweto, Mogale City and Randfontein. These could be explained by clustering of peripheral areas detached from the economic core (such as a combination of apartheid housing, e.g., Soweto) and depressed mining and industrial areas under economic stress. This may also apply to the pattern of clustering at the provincial and national levels.

There is less clustering visible at the provincial level with similar pockets (as the local government cluster map) of low-low clusters (areas where most of the economic activities take place) in the central parts of Gauteng, as well as areas in the north east and south west. The high-high dissatisfaction with provincial government performance clusters are concentrated in the southern areas of Gauteng, and apart from the Vanderbijlpark/Sebokeng area, vary from the local cluster map in terms of a few additional areas in the east (Ekurhuleni/Lesedi). The high-low cluster areas could be explained by the presence of similar economically-distressed peripheral areas as mentioned above, such as pockets of apartheid townships (e.g., Alexandra) alongside rich areas such as Sandton or new informal townships alongside rich areas in Germiston.

The dissatisfaction with national government performance map reveals significantly less clustering with separate pockets of low-low dissatisfaction in the central areas of Gauteng

and south west Merafong. Similar to the local and provincial cluster maps, a band of high-high clusters is evident in the south of Gauteng, but in this case from Emfuleni to Midvaal and Lesedi. Although there is a variation in the spatial clustering of dissatisfaction with government performance across all three cluster maps, it is clear that the central core of Gauteng exhibits the lowest levels of dissatisfaction, whilst the southern areas exhibit a clustering of high levels of dissatisfaction. The next section explores the SDM model for each of the spheres.

4.2.2. *Spatial Durbin Model*

As indicated in the previous section, this paper employs the SDM to produce consistent estimators by incorporating cross-sectional dependence in the dependent variable and the independent variables. The SDM model adopts the following functional form:

$$y = \rho W y + X\beta + WX\theta + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

where W is the weight matrix; y is a vector of order $(n \times 1)$; x is the $(n \times k)$ matrix of observations of correlates (explanatory variables); β is a $(k \times 1)$ vector of parameters, θ is a vector coefficient parameter of the spatial lags of the independent variables, and ρ is the autoregressive parameter of the SAR process that intervenes in the random term, ϵ . Besides computing the estimates of the above model (Equation (1)), the impacts of the correlates on the dependent variable in the forms of direct effects, indirect effects, and total effects are also determined. The total effects encompassing both (i) the impact and feedback effects of a given explanatory variable on the dependent variable in the same ward (direct effect), and (ii) the effects of the same explanatory variable on the dependent variable in neighbouring wards (indirect effects or spillover effects) - are interpreted as the total change (on average) in the dependent variable across all other wards arising from a one-unit change in the respective explanatory variable in a given ward (LeSage and Pace, 2009).

While the magnitude of estimates (coefficients) must be interpreted with respect to the results of the impacts (direct, indirect, and total) as explained above, the direction of the relationship between the dependent variable and correlates (explanatory variables) is conserved. That is, a negative relationship means that an increase in the explanatory variable (e.g., average sense of safety or average score access to service) leads to an associated decrease in the level of dissatisfaction with government performance. Conversely, a positive relationship means that an increase in the explanatory variable leads to an associated increase in the level of dissatisfaction with government performance.

We included dummy municipality variables to estimate the effects of the municipalities on the levels of dissatisfaction at a ward-level in Equation (1). Tshwane metropolitan municipality was used as reference municipality since overall municipal-level results show that dissatisfaction with government performance (in all the three spheres) in Tshwane municipality is lower vis-a-vis other municipalities in Gauteng. In Tables 3, 4, and 5 we report on the statistically significant coefficients for local, provincial, and national spheres, respectively.

Table 3 shows statistically significant explanatory variables (correlates) of the level of dissatisfaction with the performance of local government. The coefficients of these identified

significant correlates (see column 2 of Table 3) are the same as those of the direct effects (see column 3 of Table 3) - with negligible differences. These include: percentage dissatisfied with their dwelling, percentage agree country is going in the wrong direction, percentage of respondents who think lack of maintenance is the biggest problem, average number of years of education, average score access to services, percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, and average sense of safety index. With regards to the direct effects, the average sense of safety correlate had the highest coefficient in magnitude and, together with the average score, access to services correlate had negative relationships with the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance on average, respectively (which are to be expected). The rest of the significant correlates had positive relationships with the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance varying magnitudes accordingly. These relationships are as expected.

Negative indirect effects - for average sense of safety, average score to access services, percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, percentage of respondent who agree country is going to the wrong direction, and percentage of respondents who think maintenance is a major problem variables - imply that the spatial spillover in neighboring wards resulting from some change in a given ward for these correlates lead to a decrease (as determined by the size of the respective coefficient) in the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance. Except for average sense of safety and average score to access services correlates, such observed negative relationships are counterintuitive in that one would expect these correlates (i.e., percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, percentage of respondent who agree country is going to the wrong direction, and percentage of respondents who think maintenance is a major problem) to have positive relationships with the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance. However, these negative indirect effects are absorbed by positive direct effects resulting in overall positive relationships (as measured by total effects) of these correlates with the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance. Average sense of safety and average score to access services correlates have negative total effects as we would expect, while dissatisfied with dwelling and the education level of respondents (measured as the average number of years) had positive total effects as expected as well.

Table 3 shows that average sense of safety has more negative total effects ($= -0.982$) on the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance as compared to average score access to services ($= -0.233$). Contrastingly, among the statistically significant correlates with positive coefficients, the percentage of respondents dissatisfied with dwelling has the highest total effects ($= 0.391$). The education level of respondents (measured as the average number of years) has the least total effects ($= 0.043$) on the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance. This suggests that the more respondents are educated, the more likely they are to be dissatisfied with the performance of local government, albeit a very negligible magnitude ($= 0.043$).

The model results also show that only the dummy variable coefficient for Emfuleni is statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. Interpreting these results with respect to the City of Tshwane, which was our reference municipality, imply that the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance is higher for wards located in Emfuleni municipality. The ρ coefficient, which is the spatial autocorrelation parameter, is statistically

Table 3: SDM Results for Local Sphere

Variables	Coefficient	Direct	Indirect	Total
Average sense of safety (0-1 index)	-0.579*** (0.080)	-0.595	-0.387	-0.981
Average score access to services (0-1 index)	-0.179*** (0.054)	-0.181	-0.055	-0.233
Dissatisfaction with dwelling (% of respondents)	0.307*** (0.054)	0.310	0.081	0.391
Agreed politics waste of time (% of respondents)	0.114*** (0.049)	0.112	-0.054	0.059
Average number of years of education	0.016** (0.008)	0.017	0.026	0.043
Agreed country in wrong direction (% of respondents)	0.251*** (0.047)	0.250	-0.046	0.204
Lack of maintenance main problem (% of respondents)	0.272*** (0.071)	0.271	-0.021	0.250
W*percentage African	1.417** (0.610)			
W*percentage colored	1.312** (0.625)			
W*percentage Indian	1.613*** (0.616)			
W*percentage white	1.492*** (0.603)			
Johannesburg	-0.007 (0.088)	-0.004	0.060	0.055
Ekurhuleni	0.064 (0.087)	0.060	-0.108	-0.049
Lesedi	0.171 (0.117)	0.168	-0.108	0.115
Midvaal	-0.002 (0.104)	-0.004	-0.052	-0.056
Emfuleni	0.232*** (0.111)	0.225	-0.158	0.067
Mogale City	-0.170 (0.103)	-0.016	0.032	0.017
Randfontein	0.030 (0.128)	0.031	0.008	0.040
Westonaria	0.116 (0.128)	0.110	-0.157	-0.047
Merafong City	-0.028 (0.195)	-0.026	0.024	-0.003
Rho	0.281***			
N	506			
Log-likelihood ratio	459.386			

significant - meaning that there is a spatial effect of dependent variable in neighboring wards on the dependent variable in a given ward. The same spatial effect is evidenced in the race-based lag correlates that all have statistically significant coefficients - meaning that there are race-based neighborhood effects across the study area.

Table 4 lists the statistically significant correlates of the provincial model. Statistically significant correlates with negative total effects are; average sense of safety, average score to access services, and percentage of respondents dissatisfied with life. The coefficients of these identified significant correlates (see column 2 of Table 4) are the same as those of the direct effects (see column 3 of Table 4) with negligible differences. Average sense of safety has a negative direct effect (-0.399) higher (in absolute terms) than the indirect effect (-0.334). This suggests that an increase in average sense of safety by one unit leads to 0.733 (as total effect) percentage-point decrease in the level of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance, on average, across all the wards.

The average score access to services variable has a negative direct effect (-0.108) which suggests that for this correlate, positive changes (increase) in a particular ward would result in decreasing levels of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance as one would expect. However, the indirect effects for average score access to services is positive (= 0.045). This suggests that an increase in the average score access to services in a given ward would also result in an increase in the levels of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance across neighbouring wards. As counter intuitive as such an observation might be, the observed positive indirect effects are absorbed by the negative direct effects resulting in negative total effects of -0.063. As expected, this means that an increase in average score access to services by one unit leads to 0.063 (as total effect) percentage-point decrease in the level of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance, on average, across all the wards.

With regard to the percentage of respondents dissatisfied with life, while the direct effect is positive as expected, the spatial effects emanating from the indirect effect are negative, implying the total effects measuring the relationship between the percentage of respondents dissatisfied with life and the level of dissatisfaction with the performance of the provincial government is negative - a surprising finding.

Other model results, those with positive coefficients, indicate that a percentage-point increase in percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, percentage of respondents who agree the country is going in the wrong direction, percentage of respondents dissatisfied with dwelling, percentage who paid bribe, percentage colored lead to increases of 0.104, 0.161, 0.309, 0.711, 2.895 percentage point in the level of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance as total effects (on average). With regard to average education level, the observed positive direct effect (0.023) suggests that increase in average education level is associated with increase in the levels of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance. However, the negative indirect effects of almost the same magnitude in value (= -0.021) as the direct effects (0.023) suggest that increase in average education level in a given ward would result in decreasing levels of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance across neighbouring wards (i.e., spatial spillover effects). As a result, although positive, the total effect coefficient is very small in magnitude (0.003). That is, an increase of average education level by one unit leads to 0.003 percentage-point increase in the level

of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance (on average).

The above interpretation with regard to the level of education applies to the percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time and the percentage of respondents who agree country is going in the wrong direction, where the magnitude of positive direct effects are reduced by the magnitude of indirect effects, leading to positive total effects as well. The percentage of respondents who paid bribe and percentage of respondents who are colored have both positive direct and indirect effects - suggesting that when these variables increase by a percentage point each, the level of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance increases by 0.711 and 2.895, respectively.

The presence of lag-related spatial effects is evidenced in all the race variables, as well as those respondents who paid bribe. Similar, lag-related spatial effects (with respect to the dependent variable - the level of dissatisfaction with the performance of provincial government) are evidenced in a statistically significant rho coefficient - meaning that there is a spatial effect of dependent variable in neighboring wards on the dependent variable in a given ward. None of the municipality dummies were statistically significant, implying that there are no municipal-based spatial effects as postulated.

Table 5 shows the statistically significant coefficients for the various correlates of the level of dissatisfaction with national government performance. The interpretation of results in Table 5 is similar to the interpretation of results as reported for local and provincial spheres of government in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. However, we only report on variables that have unexpected relationships with the dependent variable (i.e. level of dissatisfaction with the performance of national government).

Those with positive total effects are: percentage dissatisfied with their dwelling, percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, percentage of respondents who paid a bribe, all race variables, percentage of respondents living in a formal dwelling, percentage agree country is going in the wrong direction, average education level, and percentage of respondents dissatisfied with life. Statistically significant correlates with negative total effects are: average sense of safety index, percentage of respondents who think hunger is the biggest problem in the community, average score access to services, and percentage of respondents who think corruption is big problem.

The coefficients (all direct, indirect, and total effects) for percentage of respondents who think hunger is the biggest problem in the community and percentage of respondents who think corruption is a big problem are negative - relationships that were not anticipated. These results illustrate the difficulty of evaluating perceptions (often subjective) in surveys.

The following correlates - percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, percentage of respondents living in a formal dwelling, percentage of respondents dissatisfied with life, percentage agree country is going in the wrong direction, and average education level - had positive direct effects and negative indirect effects, but positive total effects. With that said, it is the negative indirect effects, measuring the spatial spillover effects, which decrease the magnitude of relationship between the various correlates and the level of performance of government at the national sphere.

Table 5 further shows that there are evident lag-related spatial effects with regard to all race correlates as well as percentage of respondents who think hunger is a big problem

Table 4: SDM Results for Provincial Sphere

Variables	Coefficient	Direct	Indirect	Total
Average sense of safety (0-1 Index)	-0.385*** (0.077)	-0.399	-0.344	-0.733
Dissatisfaction with dwelling (% of respondents)	0.256*** (0.052)	0.259	0.050	0.309
Agreed politics waste of time (% of respondents)	0.178*** (0.045)	0.175	-0.072	0.104
Average number of years of education	0.024*** (0.007)	0.023	-0.021	0.003
Agreed country in wrong direction (% of respondents)	0.231*** (0.046)	0.228	-0.067	0.161
Those paid a bribe (% of respondents)	0.166** (0.070)	0.188	0.523	0.711
Average score access to services (0-1 index)	-0.110** (0.049)	-0.108	0.045	-0.063
Percentage colored	0.525** (0.242)	0.623	2.272	2.895
Percentage dissatisfied with life	0.135** (0.050)	0.129	-0.140	-0.018
W*percentage African	1.577*** (0.552)			
W*percentage coloured	1.489*** (0.570)			
W*percentage Indian	1.713*** (0.564)			
W*percentage white	1.647*** (0.550)			
W* Those paid a bribe (% of respondents)	0.329** (0.147)			
Johannesburg	0.005 (0.083)	0.006	0.039	0.046
Ekurhuleni	0.031 (0.084)	0.029	-0.062	-0.033
Lesedi	0.010 (0.112)	0.014	0.083	.097
Midvaal	0.017 (0.099)	0.015	-0.055	-0.041
Emfuleni	0.061 (0.106)	0.059	-0.030	0.029
Mogale City	-0.002 (0.099)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
Randfontein	0.035 (0.120)	0.034	-0.014	0.020
Westonaria	-0.066 (0.122)	-0.066	-0.015	-0.081
Merafong City	0.152 (0.184)	-0.019	0.006	-0.094
Rho	0.304***			
N	506			
Log-likelihood ratio	488.354			

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$. W denotes the spatial lag of the respective variable.

Table 5: SDM Results for National Sphere

Variables	Coefficient	Direct	Indirect	Total
Average sense of safety (0-1 index)	-0.261*** (0.078)	-0.270	-0.356	-0.626
Dissatisfaction with dwelling (% of respondents)	0.285*** (0.054)	0.285	0.040	0.326
Agreed politics waste of time (% of respondents)	0.132** (0.046)	0.132	-0.017	0.115
Average score access to services (0-1 index)	-0.121** (0.056)	-0.121	-0.010	-0.131
Average number of years of education	0.030*** (0.007)	0.030	-0.007	0.023
Agreed country in wrong direction (% of respondents)	0.266*** (0.044)	0.265	-0.043	0.223
Those paid a bribe (% of respondents)	0.182*** (0.068)	0.189	0.248	0.436
Think hunger is big problem (% of respondents)	-0.719** (0.325)	-0.767	-1.849	-2.616
Think corruption is big problem (% of respondents)	-0.205** (0.098)	-0.208	-0.100	-0.308
Those living in a formal dwelling (% of respondents)	0.066*** (0.027)	0.065	-0.020	0.046
Percentage dissatisfied with life	0.135*** (0.049)	0.133	-0.090	0.035
Percentage African	0.817*** (0.241)	0.861	1.712	2.573
Percentage coloured	0.849*** (0.247)	0.893	1.669	2.562
Percentage Indian	0.845*** (0.249)	0.894	1.872	2.766
Percentage white	0.825*** (0.240)	0.872	1.798	2.670
Johannesburg	-0.016 (0.084)	-0.015	0.051	0.036
Ekurhuleni	-0.007 (0.084)	-0.008	-0.031	-0.039
Lesedi	0.063 (0.113)	0.062	-0.009	0.053
Midvaal	-0.005 (0.101)	-0.004	0.042	0.038
Emfuleni	-0.000 (0.107)	0.001	0.043	0.044
Mogale City	0.039 (0.099)	0.037	-0.058	-0.021
Randfontein	0.047 (0.122)	0.047	-0.047	-0.001
Westonaria	-0.061 (0.122)	-0.061	0.012	-0.049
Merafong City	-0.089 (0.186)	-0.088	0.026	-0.063
W*percentage African	1.324** (0.575)			
W*percentage colored	1.282** (0.591)			
W*percentage Indian	1.456** (0.581)			
W*percentage white	1.396** (0.571)			
W*Those who think hunger is big problem (% of respondents)	-1.457** (0.711)			
Rho	0.168***			
N	506			
Log-likelihood ratio	489.593			

Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$. W denotes the spatial lag of the respective variable.

in their community. The rho coefficient is similarly statistically significant - meaning that there is a spatial effect of dependent variable(s) in neighbouring wards on the dependent variable in a given ward. Similar to provincial government spheres results, there are no municipality-level effects at the national sphere of government.

5. CONCLUSION

Worldwide, different spheres of democratic governments are responsible for governing and providing services to their citizens as part of their legal mandate. In South Africa and Gauteng, the experiences of widespread service delivery protests and increasing levels of dissatisfaction with government performance across the three spheres of government has meant that these spheres of government have come under increasing pressure to address the concerns of their residents. This paper, which focused on ward-level analysis at the three spheres of government, reveals interesting spatial variations of residents' opinions of government performance across the three spheres of government.

Descriptive statistics for the level of dissatisfaction with local government performance at the ward level ranges from 4.4 percent to 94.4 percent, with a mean of 53.1 percent. The level of dissatisfaction with provincial government performance ranges from 5.9 percent to 80 percent, while the level of dissatisfaction with national government performance ranges from 5.9 percent to 81.3 percent. The provincial and national government spheres have mean dissatisfaction with government performance of 48.2 percent and 46.1 percent, respectively. Accordingly, the highest levels of dissatisfaction with government performance are with the local sphere, followed by the provincial and national governments. As pointed in the literature review section, these observed patterns could be explained by overlaps and shared responsibilities across the three spheres of government, which may lead to citizens confusion about how the responsibilities across the three spheres of government are divided, shared and monitored.

Spatial patterns in the dissatisfaction with the performance of government were revealed through the constructed cluster maps. Evidently, dissatisfaction with the performance of local government is more clustered, followed by spatial clustering at the provincial level. Spatial clustering is less evident with the national level of dissatisfaction with the performance of government. Although there is a variation in the spatial clustering of dissatisfaction with government performance across all three spheres of government, it is clear that the central core of Gauteng exhibits the lowest levels of dissatisfaction, whilst the southern areas exhibit a clustering of high levels of dissatisfaction across all three spheres.

Our examination showed spatial differentiation and clustering in the dependent variable (i.e., dissatisfaction with government performance at the three spheres) and among correlates (explanatory variables) of dissatisfaction with government performance. These variations and dynamics mirror the legacy of apartheid past. For example, our results show that neighborhoods (wards) that were socio-economically excluded under apartheid are experiencing higher levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of government as compared to previously non-segregated neighborhoods (wards) that are generally located in the core areas of the province. However, there are pockets of improvement in service provision in some previously socio-economically disadvantaged areas that can also be noticeable. This

“mixed bag” of successes and failures in improvement in service provision in previously socio-economically disadvantaged areas has a bearing on the spatial patterns of the levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of government as well as on the associated correlates.

Further spatial analysis using Spatial Durbin models provided correlates of the percentage dissatisfaction with government performance (as the dependent variable). As detailed in Tables 3, 4, and 5, these correlates have positive and negative relationships, and the results reveal common correlates across all three spheres of government. These include: the percentage of respondents dissatisfied with their dwelling, average sense of safety index, average number of years of education, average score access to services, percentage of respondents who agree politics is a waste of time, and percentage of respondents who agree that the country is going in the wrong direction. This provides an indication that objective issues around housing and safety and security, should be a focus of all spheres of government in an attempt to address dissatisfaction with government performance. The more subjective measures, such as the country is going in the wrong direction, may be harder to address as they represent a deeper loss of faith and trust in all spheres of government, but provide an indication why residents are not happy with the performance of government.

The race-related correlates show interesting findings. They show that, while race-related correlates (i.e., percentage African, percentage colored, percentage Indian, and percentage white) are significant at the national level (except percentage coloured that is significant at the provincial level as well), there is evidence of race-related spatial spillover effects across all the three spheres of government in the study area. These spatial spillover effects are captured by statistically significant race-related lag correlates (i.e., W^* percentage African, W^* percentage coloured, W^* percentage Indian, and W^* percentage white). While these results do not show uniformity across all three spheres of government, the results, suggest that the race issue is alive and has a bearing on how residents perceive the performances of the three spheres of government.

The spatial analysis also revealed a variation of the correlates across the three spheres. The percentage of respondents who think the lack of maintenance is the biggest problem in their community is the only correlate that appears significant at the local sphere, indicating a renewed focus on maintenance is required by the local sphere. At the provincial and national level, the percentage of respondents who paid a bribe, percentage of respondents dissatisfied with life, and percentage of respondents living in a formal dwelling, for example, are additional correlates. The payment of bribes reflects a further subjective measure of corruption that concerns residents. The percentage of respondents dissatisfied with life and percentage of respondents living in a formal dwelling require further research to fully understand the implications of these correlates.

Beyond the additional provincial correlates (i.e., percentage colored, percentage dissatisfied with life, and percentage who paid a bribe), the percentage of respondents who think hunger is the main problem and percentage of respondents who think corruption is the main problem are correlates at the national level. These results raise food provision and food security, as well as the fight on corruption by the residents in the survey. An examination of the various maps of these correlates at a ward level revealed discernible patterns across Gauteng, highlighting hotspots for government to focus on. Our results confirmed past results, where socio-economic status variables (in our case, income) have not produced

significant relationships with citizens attitudes about government-provided services (Brown and Coulter, 1983).

However, the disjuncture between perceptions of government performance and satisfaction with services is clearly evident in this paper's results with more subjective correlates as opposed to objective correlates (for example, access to government-provided services) emerging in the analysis. This suggests that future work should focus on identifying objective indicators from the side of the service providers (government) and subjective indicators identified from citizens surveys. Correlation analysis should then be performed at the lowest spatial levels since past results show that, at the aggregate level, the correlations between objective and subjective indicators might not be apparent. In our case, we tried to isolate objective measures from the citizens survey itself, but the QoL survey data did not allow for clear delineation. Perhaps, for future work we could compare the QoL survey data with some hard (objective) indicators data from municipalities (or from the province) to assess the existence of possible correlations.

Overall, by focusing on a ward-level analysis and using a spatial statistical approach, Gauteng's different spheres of government will be able to better understand the patterns and correlates of dissatisfaction with government performance at a more fine-grained level, assisting with the spatial targeting of specific policies, where applicable. Further research using geographically weighted regression (GWR) lends itself to a deeper spatial understanding of dissatisfaction with government performance. A focus on GWR using the QoL survey data will answer the question: Do the significant correlates that explain dissatisfaction with the government performance at the three spheres vary across the GCR?

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