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# How Does the Age Structure Affect Local Economies in the US?\*

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Abstract: This study examines the impacts of population aging on a wide range of economic indicators from a regional perspective. Many countries, including the United States, are experiencing demographic aging. This may have a dramatic impact on both the national and sub-national economies. However, there is little consensus about its impact on local sub-national economies. This study uses regional variation in age structure to explain economic outcomes at the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) level. In order to identify causal effects, Mahalanobis distances were calculated to identify the matched cities as instrumental variables. The study finds that regions with older age structures tend to have higher growth rates of GDP per capita and lower growth rates of unemployment, but such positive effects are likely to fade away in the long run. Additionally, there is no significant impact of age composition on income. The choice of variables is critical as it can lead to mixed results. The results are robust before, during and after the economic recession. Quantile regression is also used to explore potential heterogeneous effects among MSAs. The results show that MSAs, regardless of their size, are uniformly affected by the age structure. *Keywords*: population aging, local labor market, instrumental variable, matching *JEL Codes*: J11, J21, R11

## 1. INTRODUCTION

"With every mouth God sends a pair of hands." This old saying provides a good starting point for thinking about the impact of population on economic growth. Demographic changes not only affect the consumption needs of an economy (the number of mouths), but also affect the productive capacity of the economy (the number of hands). Many countries are seeing their

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populations aging faster than before. In 2018, the population aged 65 or above outnumbered those under five years old for the first time in history. By 2050, one in six (16%) people in the world will be above 65 years old, up from one in eleven (9%) in 2019. In the US, this ratio already reached one in six in 2016 (United Nations, 2019)

As the world population grows older, there is a natural reason to worry about economic growth. With fewer people contributing to social security funds, the working-age population faces more pressure economically (Nishiyama, 2015). In addition to labor (population), other inputs, such as capital and technology, are also part of the production function, which makes the interaction of population and economic growth even more complicated (Casamatta and Batte, 2016).

The US population has experienced significant demographic changes over the last few decades. Although the sheer volume of the total population has been growing steadily over the past years, the composition of the population, including gender, race and ethnicity, has dramatically changed. These trends can be still expected to continue in the future (Ortman et al., 2014). Among all the factors contributing to this transformation, age plays a very important role. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics report released in December 2015, the proportions of different age groups have evolved and profoundly reshaped the US labor force. In 1994, the median age of US workers was only 37.7 years, but this measure rose to 40.3 years by 2004 and to 41.9 years by 2014. This increase in the median age of the labor force can be seen across all race and gender subgroups, and also across all geographic regions. However, very little attention has been paid to this age variation at the sub-national level.

Some stylized facts about demographic changes in the US provide a starting point for this study. Although the working-age population has been growing, the growth rate has decreased. The labor force growth rate was higher than the population growth rate before 2000, but it became relatively lower thereafter (Ortman et al., 2014). The labor-force participation rate, another important aspect of labor market, has consistently declined over the years, from 66.4% in 1994 to 62.9% in 2014. However, the labor-force participation rate of the elderly population has increased concurrently (Börsch-Supan, 2003).

With a smaller working-age population, the growth of local economies could possibly decline. Therefore, the questions of interest are: how are aging Americans changing the economy? Is there any association between the aging trends and economic outcomes? This study explores the answers to these questions by examining the regional variations of such effects among metropolitan areas. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine population aging's impact on local economy at MSA level using time-differenced two-stage least square (2SLS) method.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, I review the methodology and findings of previous studies that assess age structure and its influence on the economy; in Section 3, I describe the data source, basic model settings and identification strategies used in the empirical analysis; regression results are discussed in Section 4; the last section is a summary of the main findings and an outlook for further research.

# LITERATURE REVIEW

2.

The impacts of demographic changes on the economy have been widely studied by economists. Some early economic theories focused on the growth of population (eg. the Malthusian model), under the assumption that the total resource (output) was fixed at that time. Some more recent economic theory focused less on the population growth rate (eg. the Solow model), because other factors in the production function, such as technology and physical capital, are playing a more important role today (Kelley and Schmidt, 1995). However, much of the traditional economic theories concerning economic development largely ignored the age structure. This is somewhat expected because population aging is a relatively new phenomenon, and it does not happen until the completion of demographic transition. While the increasing importance of the aging population has been well-documented (Becker et al., 1999), its economic effects have only recently come to the fore. In most literature, demographics are the main explanatory variables with economic outcomes being dependent variables. Both macro and micro data sets have been used, and a great deal of measurement has been examined in the existing research (Kelley and Schmidt, 2005).

In the field of macroeconomics, most evidences show that key macroeconomic variables will be negatively influenced by demographic structure (Aksoy et al., 2019). However, the channels through which aging affects the economy remain unclear. One line of research looks at the age effect on productivity. For example, a 5% increase in the cohort of age 40-49 over ten years seems to be associated with 1-2% productivity growth for each year in this period (Feyrer, 2007). Some research has found that the negative economic impacts of aging result from decreased saving rates, total factor productivity and investments (Kögel, 2005). Besides productivity, other economic outcomes have been examined as well. For example, it is well accepted that future developed economies will be composed of a smaller and older labor force (Prskawetz et al., 2008). The evidence further indicates that the estimated growth effects of income per capita, educational attainment and population growth would be biased if the age distribution were not accounted for.

In the field of microeconomics, the potential association between age and economic outcomes has attracted the attention of labor economists. The effects of age on earnings first captured economists' attention in the 1970s, when the peak baby-boom generation entered labor markets (Freeman, 1979). This type of research is motivated by the fact that, as the baby boom generation ages, the share of younger workers is decreasing. These researchers primarily explore the impacts of age cohort size on earnings using individual-level data (Welch, 1979).

Due to population aging, both the supply and demand sides of the economy will be affected (Maestas et al., 2013). Since equilibrium is determined by both of them, it is important to examine the offsetting impacts of an aging population.

On the supply side, the size and skill composition of labor supply will surely change. As the quantity of young labor decreases, population aging will lead to capital deepening that increases wages and productivity (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Hsu and Lo, 2019). Thus, the possible imperfect substitutability between the workforces of different ages implies that there exists an optimal age structure that leads to the maximized output (Feyrer, 2007). On the one hand, population aging, which narrows the innovative life cycle, could reduce the aggregate

creative output (Jones, 2010). On the other hand, the elderly can still make a significant contribution to the economy, such as taking care of grandchildren and volunteering, although this will not be reflected in many economic statistics since these activities often do not involve monetary payments (Bloom et al., 2007). Thus, it is essential to examine the net effects on the supply side.

On the demand side, although the dissaving by the elderly can reduce the saving rates and harm the economy (Amaglobeli et al., 2019), the net impacts on consumer demand is unknown, because the age structure alters the product composition of consumer demand. For example, the elderly population could shift the demand from education to healthcare, but the net effect of these demand shifts could go either way (Assadian, 1995; Hock and Weil, 2012). Therefore, population aging can have both positive and negative impacts on both the demand and supply sides.

In summary, the relationship between age variables and economic outcomes is complicated. Although previous research has built models to explain the complicated mechanism, empirical evidence is still rare. One main reason is the challenge of dealing with the endogeneity of age structures (Prettner, 2013). Most existing empirical studies explore the age effect on the economy using either individual-level data or international comparison. However, the regional variation of age compositions within a country is largely ignored<sup>1</sup>. This regional approach can provide additional insights, as the confounding effect of cultural and legal differences in retirement age across national borders will not distort the results.

Drawing on the discussion above, this study aims to examine the effects of age compositions on US MSAs. To identify causal effects, the IV-matching technique is used to find suitable instrument variables. The results are robust under different specifications, and lead to the conclusion that regions with older structure tend to have relatively faster growth of GDP per capita and slower growth of unemployment, although such positive effects are likely to fade away in the long run.

#### 3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The basic unit of analysis is the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) because they provide a good measure of functional economic areas. MSAs are designed explicitly by capturing local labor markets with at least 25% commuting between counties and the principal core of metro areas (Partridge et al., 2017). County-level data are not used in this study due to availability, as the Bureau of Economic Analysis only publishes GDP data at the state and MSA levels.

#### 3.1. Explanatory Variable: Degree of Population Aging

The key variables of interest measure the relative size of the aging population in the US MSAs. Specifically, four proxies - the median age, share of prime-age (25-54 years old)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>There is another study examining the effects of population aging on local economy. However, only statelevel data were used (Maestas et al., 2016). Compared to states, MSAs are a better measure for local labor markets in the US economy.

workers, senior dependency ratio and the share of senior population will be used to measure the age structures across MSAs.

The first explanatory variable is "median age." This is a good measure in that it can represent the age distribution of the total population. However, this measure would be less effective in evaluating labor market effects, because it is affected by the number of children who have not yet entered the labor market. The table below provides an example showing the regional variation of median ages among MSAs (only the top five and the bottom five are listed):

MSA	Median Age
Provo-Orem, UT	24.6
Ames, IA	25.7
Logan, UT-ID	25.8
Manhattan, KS	26.3
Jacksonville, NC	26.5
National Median Age	38.0
Barnstable Town, MA	52.4
Sebring, FL	52.7
Homosassa Springs, FL	56.0
Punta Gorda, FL	57.9
The Village, FL	66.5

Table 1: MSAs with the Lowest and the Highest Median Age in 2015

The second variable, "share of prime-age population," is defined as the fraction of people between 25 and 54 years old. Compared with the entire "working-age population" (defined by the U.S. Department of Labor as those between 16 and 64 years old), prime-age population has several favorable traits. One advantage is prime-age workers have not entered the retirement age window and still have strong incentives to stay in the labor force. Another advantage is that the prime-age population tends to earn more, because most high school and college students are excluded. This is a good measure of "population dividend," as it represents the most productive age group.


The third variable "the share of old population" is defined as the fraction of people above 65 years old. One advantage of this operational definition is the consistency with the concept of "population aging" as defined by OECD<sup>2</sup>. Another advantage is that this operational definition can largely represent the pensionable population. Social security's full-benefit retirement age is gradually increasing because of legislation passed by Congress in 1983. Based on the legislation, most people aged 65 years or older during the study period

 $<sup>^{2}</sup> https://data.oecd.org/pop/elderly-population.htm$ 

2003-2014 would have the opportunity to retire without compromising their benefits<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the labor supply of this cohort was not affected by the pension concerns.

The fourth variable is the "senior dependency ratio". This ratio compares the number of people above 65 years old to the working age population. The denominator differs from the whole population in that the youth dependents are deducted from the denominator. Thus, only the economically active population are included in the calculation, which yields a more precise picture of "dependency" defined by age. The lower values may underscore greater financial pressures on the social security system.

In summary, all four proxies capture different aspects of the changing workforce and total population. Any single indicator may contain significant measurement errors which leads to estimation errors. Thus, all proxies will be examined in the following analysis in order to give a full picture of population aging's impact. The chart below displays the age composition of the US population since 2005:



## Figure 1: Age Group Composition of US Population, (2005-2015)

### 3.2. Dependent Variable: Economic Growth, Labor Market Outcomes and Incomes

A wide range of economic indicators which evaluate different aspects of the overall economic performance is used as dependent variables. To measure the regional economic growth, I

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ Traditionally, the full benefit age was 65, and early retirement benefits were first available at the age of 62, with a permanent reduction to 80 percent of the full benefit amount. Currently, the full-benefit retirement age in the US is 66 for people born in 1943-1954, and it will gradually rise to 67 for those born in 1960 or later.

obtained MSA-level GDP data in 2005-2015<sup>4</sup> from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Both GDP per capita (the measure of well-being) and GDP per worker (the measure of productivity) were calculated. To measure labor market outcomes, I also collected indicators such as labor force participation rate, unemployment rate and the number of jobs at the MSA level from the American Community Survey and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

The annual growth rate was calculated to measure the short-term effects, while the 10-year change rate was used to gauge the long-term effects. To account for only labor force effects, the population aged 18 or less will be excluded from the denominator when calculating per capita GDP; therefore the number of dependent children will not distort the labor market ratios. The trends of economic variables from 2005 to 2015 are displayed in Figure A.1.

#### 3.3. Model

The basic model takes the following form:

$$\Delta Y_{i,t} = \alpha X_{i,t-1} + \beta_j + \Theta Z_{i,t-1} + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

where Y is a range of key economic indicators including GDP growth, labor market outcomes and personal incomes;  $\Delta Y$  represents the change rate of these economic variables in the short run (1 year) and the long run (10 years);  $\alpha$  is the coefficient before the age structure variables, which is the main coefficient of interest;  $\beta_j$  is the state fixed effects, which control for timeinvariant characteristics of each state;  $Z_{i,t}$  is a vector of time-varying covariates including demographic factors other than age, including education, gender and race compositions of the population in one MSA in a given year. The residual is represented by  $\epsilon$ , and robust standard errors are reported in the results tables.

Physical capital is also an important factor in most production functions. However, since no useful government statistics on MSA-level capital investment can be found at this time, this model assumes that the production technology, as well as the capital/labor ratio, is the same across MSAs. Therefore, the rate of return is equalized across the country. This is an appropriate assumption inside a domestic economy with highly mobile capital.

One important empirical challenge in estimating the effects is the endogeneity of the age structure. Potential confounders remain after controlling for time and state fixed effects, which could invalidate the causal relationship, since the age composition of the local population may be endogenous itself. For example, younger people are more likely to be attracted by places where there is a vital labor market with many opportunities, while places full of energetic younger people are more likely to have better economic performance. To account for these and other factors driving both the degree of population aging and the economic performance in MSAs, I use an "IV-matching" strategy to identify instrumental variables (Zhang et al., 2020). Specifically, the Mahalanobis distance will be calculated for each MSA pair to determine their best matches based on economic and demographic statistics in 2005:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The American Community Survey was initially launched in 2005. The 2015 ACS data were the most recent data at the time of writing this paper.

$$d(\overrightarrow{x}, \overrightarrow{y}) = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \frac{(x_i - y_i)^2}{s_i^2}}$$
(2)

where N characteristics of MSAs will be used to calculate the distance between MSA X and MSA Y;  $s_i$  is the standard error of trait i.For example, the median age of the MSA with the smallest Mahalanobis distance will be used as an instrumental variable for the MSA of study. The calculation of Mahalanobis distance includes population size, sex ratio, share of white population and share of population with at least a Bachelor's degree. To prevent any spatial spillover effects, the matched MSA cannot be in the same state as the original MSA<sup>5</sup>. Since the boundaries of each MSA are based on the commuting between counties, the spatial spillover effects between nearby MSAs should not be a major issue. Descriptive statistics show that those variables chosen as criteria are highly correlated with age compositions, and their correlation is reported in Table A.2. The first stage F-statistics are also reported showing a strong association between instruments and the endogenous age structure variables.

#### 4. **RESULTS**

#### 4.1. Short-Term Effects

In this subsection, the impacts of population aging on annual changes of economic variables are examined. I begin by estimating ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to explore the relationship between age profiles and economic outcomes. The results are presented in Table A.3. From these results we can see that GDP growth rates are generally not associated with age composition. However, after controlling for the population size, MSAs with older age structures tend to have a higher growth rate of GDP per worker and GDP per capita. Regarding local labor markets, it was surprising to find that labor force participation rates are not affected by age compositions. Additionally, older age structures are likely to cause a slower growth of unemployment rates, and the results on non-farm and farm jobs are mixed. None of the four variables representing age structures was significantly associated with the growth rate of income variables.

As discussed in section 3, a matching strategy based on Mahalanobis distance was used to identify the instrumental variable for the age structures to address endogeneity. This model is the preferred approach for short-run effects, and the results are reported in Table A.4. The findings from the 2SLS models are generally consistent with those in the OLS models. First-stage F-statistics are reported and indicate no concerns about weak instruments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>For example, if A is the best match for X and both of them are in the same state, then the second best match B (supposing B and X are not in the same state) will be used to instrument for X. If a MSA crosses state borders, then the state of the core metro area will be treated as the state of the MSA. For example, the state of Cincinnati-Wilmington-Maysville MSA will be Ohio, because Cincinnati is the core metro area.

#### 4.2. Long-Term Effects

In this subsection, I examine the impacts of population aging's level on ten-year changes of economic variables. Other than short-run effects (annual growth rates), this study also looks at long-term effects (10-year change rates). The OLS results are presented in Table A.5. In the long run, MSAs with older age structures tend to have a slower GDP growth rate. However, such detrimental effects were not statistically significant after controlling for the population size. The 10-year growth of both labor-force participation rates and unemployment rates are not affected by age compositions. But the increase in median age and the share of population above 65 years old are likely to decrease total number of jobs, which is largely driven by the decrease in non-farm jobs. In terms of income measures, income per capita and mean income for full-time workers are not significantly influenced by age structures. However, increase in median age, senior dependency ratio and the proportion of elderly population is likely to reduce the 10-year growth rate of median incomes for people above 25 years old.

A matching strategy was also used to identify suitable instrumental variables, and it is the preferred model for long-run effects.<sup>6</sup> The results of the 2SLS model are reported in Table A.6. Based on the results, the afore-mentioned effects are all gone after instrumenting for the age structure variable, suggesting that the short-term impacts of age compositions on local economy are likely to fade away in the long run.

#### 4.3. Time-Differenced Effects

In this subsection, the time-differenced OLS and 2SLS regressions of the following form are estimated:

$$\Delta Y_{i,t} = \alpha \Delta X_{i,t-1} + \beta_i + \Theta Z_{i,t-1} + \epsilon \tag{3}$$

where  $\Delta X$  includes the change rate of age structure in both short-term (1-year) and longterm (10-year). The motivation is that some MSAs may have extremely young or old age structures, which could affect their long-run performance. If that is the case, then simply using the level of population aging would not fully capture the effect. Furthermore, timedifferenced regressions will remove time-invariant factors that potentially affect both age compositions and economic outcomes (Rickman et. al, 2015). Notice, however, that the control variables are not time-differenced due to the possible endogeneity.

The results of the short-term and long-term time-differenced OLS models are reported in Table A.7 and Table A.8 respectively. Because the major explanatory variable are now the "rate of changes" rather than the "level," the interpretation will be different. Based on the short-term results, the MSAs that are getting older tend to have slower growth of GDP and GDP per capita. In terms of the local labor market performance, those MSAs are also more likely to experience a decline in labor-force participation rates, non-farm jobs as well

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Hausman tests were performed to test the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Most results confirmed the endogeneity of age structures. Although some results cannot reject the null hypothesis, it is hard to ignore the endogeneity issue documented by many previous studies (Finlay, 2006; DeGraff and Wong, 2014; Peterson, 2017; Prettner, 2013)

as total number of jobs. Although the growth rate of incomes is found to be not affected by the level of population aging, it is significantly impacted by the speed of aging. The findings show that those MSAs which are turning older will have reduced growth rates of income per capita and median income for people above 25 years old. These findings are consistent across all four indicators of age structures. The long-run OLS results are reported in Table A.8, and similar patterns are found for the time-difference models when 10-year growth rates are examined.

The results of short-term and long-term time-differenced 2SLS models are reported in Table A.9 and Table A.10 respectively. It can be seen that the portion of prime-age workers is still significant when using instrumental variables. In the short run, regions with a growing prime-age population tend to have higher growth rate of GDP per capita, labor-force participation rate and personal incomes. However, such positive effects tend to fade away in the long run, because none of the coefficients are statistically significant when examining ten-year changes.

#### 4.4. Robustness Check

As a robustness check, the study period was divided into three groups: 2005-2007, 2007-2009 and 2009-2015. This allows testing for potential heterogeneous effects across different stages in the business cycle. It is possible that the effects specific to the Great Recession may be distorting the results. Thus, are economic consequences of population aging different before, during and after the recession? Specifically, OLS models are used to examine the impacts of age structures on local economy before, during and after economic recessions,<sup>7</sup> and the detailed results are reported in Table A.11, Table A.12 and Table A.13 respectively. However, the results across the business cycle were consistent with the earlier findings. There were no significantly different effects of age structures due to the business cycle.

As another robustness check, quantile regressions were used to test for potential differing effects of age compositions across MSAs with different sizes. The quantile regression approach can provide flexibility for modeling data with heterogeneous conditional distributions (Koenker and Hallock, 2001) and it allows for heterogeneous effects on outcome variables across the spectrum of all quantiles. Thus, I ran a series of quantile regressions using GDP per capita and unemployment rates as dependent variables, respectively, because these two indicators are consistently significant in most model settings. The coefficients of age compositions in short-run models are reported in Figure A.2 and Figure A.4, and the coefficients in long-run models are plotted in Figure A.3 and Figure A.5.

These graphs illustrate how the effects of age structures vary over quantiles, and how the effects at various quantiles differ from the OLS coefficients. On the plots of coefficients, it can be clearly seen that the difference in effects among quantiles is negligible. The median estimates are also very close to the OLS point estimates, lying within the confidence interval

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>I divide the total number of years (2005-2015) into three parts: before recession (2005-2008), during recession (2008-2010) and after recession (2010-2015). The criteria for classifying the years are to match the official announcements made by NBER's Business Cycle Dating Committee. According to the latest "US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions," the Great Recession began in the 4th quarter of 2007 and ended in June 2009 (the 2nd quarter). In total, the contraction lasted for 18 months.

of OLS estimates. Thus, the results cannot reject the equality of estimated coefficients over different quantiles.

#### 5. CONCLUSIONS

This study examines the impacts of population aging on local economies using a wide range of variables, including ten economic outcome variables and four age structure variables. Both rate and level measures are examined using OLS and 2SLS regressions to find the most consistent results. Based on the above results, several conclusions can be drawn. First, age composition does not have significant impacts on the personal income of the locals. Second, in the short run, older age structures tend to have positive effects on the local economy, leading to a higher growth rate of GDP after controlling for population and a slower growth of unemployment rates. Thirdly, aforementioned positive effects are likely to fade away in the long run. The conclusions above also demonstrate the importance of choosing multiple indicators, as not all aspects of local economies are uniformly affected by all aspects of age structure. Lastly, MSAs, regardless of the size of the local economy, are almost uniformly affected by age compositions. Results from quantile regressions cannot reject the equality of coefficients before the age variables.

This study builds on the previous literature while making the following three main contributions. First, previous studies on population aging only provide evidence at the state level or on international comparison. This paper specifically focuses on MSA-level data, exploring the impact of demographic aging using a finer-solution level. Studying MSAs rather than states removes remote rural counties which presented a confounding factor, because rural demographics can be very different from urban areas. Second, this study uses more than one proxy for the degree of population aging and evaluates a wide spectrum of economic indicators. This captures a more complete picture of the economic dynamics of aging. Lastly, this study attempts to find new instrumental variables to address the endogeneity concern of age structure.

This study has two major implications for policy makers and academic researchers. First, this paper cautions local government that the potential impacts of demographic shifts could affect local economy. However, aging's impacts on local economy are mixed, and one-size-fits-all policy cannot address future demographic changes. Second, this paper cautions future studies about choosing the indicators for age structures and the measure for economic outcomes, because different choices of variables could lead to quite different results as shown in this study. A new economic measure that can include the non-market contribution of the elderly is also preferred.

Some meaningful questions about population aging's impacts on local economy remain to be answered. One line of research is to make out-of-sample predictions. Specifically, historical data can be employed to gauge the key coefficients, which represent the relationship between population aging and local economy. Thus, these coefficients can used to predict future economic performance. Another line of future research will focus on the decomposition of population aging, which results from both declining mortality and declining fertility. Theoretical models have demonstrated the potential differing impacts of these two factors. However, this empirical study cannot explore how the impact is decomposed by these two

factors without MSA-level data on mortality and fertility. Lastly, the channels through which age affects the local economy still need to be examined. Future research can take a closer look at either demand or supply with local spending data.

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# APPENDIX

	Table A.1: Variable Definitions		•			
Variables	Definitions	Mean	Std.	Min	Max	Source
	Dependent V	Variable:				
Category:	Economy					
gdp	GDP (million)	22805	50166	2265	491042	BEA
percapita	GDP per capita	40642	11847	18729	162786	BEA
perworker	GDP per worker	71672	15679	41016	204742	BEA
Category:	Labor Market					
lfpr	labor force participation rate $(\%)$	63.6	5.1	41.2	76.6	ACS
unemp	unemployment rate $(\%)$	7.86	2.88	1.8	21	ACS
employ	employment rate $(\%)$	58.04	5.79	34.1	74.1	ACS
jobtot	total number of jobs	276373	499717	37179	4647142	BEA
jobnf	number of non-farm jobs	271109	491618	36242	4434541	BEA
jobf	number of farm jobs	3100	3535	205	30379	BEA
Category:	Income					
med16	median for people 16+ with earnings	26506	4246	14455	46945	ACS
med25	median for people 25+ with earnings	31975	4536	17408	53300	ACS
mean	mean for fulltime year-round workers	49269	7920	30213	107660	ACS
average	income per capita	39690	8455	17919	118695	BEA
	Explanatory	Variable	:			
medage	median age (years)	36.68	4.32	23.3	57.9	ACS
primeage	the share of prime-age workers $(\%)$	39.61	2.64	26.5	47.3	ACS
olddepend	old-age dependency ratio (%)	22.04	6.36	8	78.6	ACS
over 65	the share of population $65+(\%)$	13.68	3.37	5.2	38.4	ACS
	Demographics as C	ontrol V	ariable:			
sex	sex ratio (males per 100 females)	97.15	4.56	83.8	140	ACS
edu	the share with college degree $(\%)$	26.76	8.51	9.99	62.42	ACS
race	the share of white population $(\%)$	80.7	11.59	46.42	97.44	ACS
pop	the total population	466335	801200	68203	7102165	ACS

Table A.1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics




Figure A.1: Changing Trends of the Age Structure and Local Economies (2005-2015)

Table A.2: Criteria Used for Finding Matched MSAs (Year=2015)

	171,	5115 (10ai –	2010)	
	medage	primeage	olddepend	over65
ln(pop)	$0.671^{***}$	0.005***	0.347	0.126
	(0.208)	(0.001)	(0.258)	(0.147)
sex	-0.536***	$0.001^{**}$	-0.786***	-0.446***
	(0.073)	(0.001)	(0.122)	(0.062)
edu	-0.051*	$0.001^{***}$	-0.183***	-0.073***
	(0.026)	(0.000)	(0.044)	(0.017)
race	$0.158^{***}$	$7 \times 10^{-5}$	$0.211^{***}$	$0.128^{***}$
	(0.017)	(0.000)	(0.027)	(0.014)
Ν	261	261	261	261
R2	0.342	0.241	0.376	0.398
Adj. R2	0.332	0.229	0.366	0.389

Note: 1. \*, \*\* and \*\*\* indicates the coefficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.

		Tab	ole A.3:	Result	s of OL	S Mode	Table A.3: Results of OLS Models (Annual Growth)	al Grov	vth)			
		Economy			Г	Local Marke	tet			Income	me	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	$_{ m Jobnf}$	Jobf	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age	$.001^{***}$	.008***	0004	0003	008***	.0005	0002	0003	0002	0004	0003	0004
Std. Err.	(.00039)	(.00029)	(.00030)	(.00023)	(.002)	(.00014)	(.00016)	(.0004)	(.00024)	(.00054)	(.00045)	(.0006)
F Stats	1.63	2.93	2.51	0.35	0.64	4.18	3.71	5.89	1.35	0.56	0.81	0.32
$R^2$	.038	.065	.042	200.	.013	076	.078	.106	.025	.012	.014	.007
# Obs.	2107	2107	2107	2373	2373	2373	2373	2373	2373	2373	2373	2373
Panel B												
Prime Age	131***	127***	059***	.021	$2.525^{***}$	139***	$116^{***}$	$.157^{***}$	055*	082	041	.082
Std. Err.	(.048)	(.037)	(.036)	(.028)	(.263)	(.019)	(.021)	(.050)	(.031)	(.063)	(.051)	(690.)
F Stats	1.60	3.06	2.53	0.33	2.25	5.35	4.25	6.10	1.50	0.59	0.80	0.33
$R^2$	.037	.067	.042	.006	.042	760.	.091	.111	.026	.013	.014	.008
# Obs.	2107	2107	2107	2373	2373	2373	2107	2107	2373	2373	2373	2373
Panel C												
Old Dep.	.0007**	$.0005^{**}$	0002	0002	0073***	$.0002^{**}$	$1.9 imes10^{-5}$	0008**	00003	0002	0003	0002
Std. Err.	(.0003)	(.0002)	(.0002)	(.0002)	(.0015)	(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0004)	(.0002)	(.0004)	(.0003)	(.0006)
F Stats	1.58	2.93	2.43	0.34	0.79	4.23	3.68	5.94	1.34	0.56	0.82	0.32
$R^2$	.037	.064	.042	.007	.017	.078	.078	.111	.025	.012	.014	.007
# Obs.	2107	2107	2371	2373	2373	2373	2107	2107	2373	2373	2373	2373
Panel D												
Over65	$.0014^{**}$	**6000.	0005	0005	$0149^{***}$	.0003	0002	0016**	0001	0003	0005	0005
Std. Err.	(.0006)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0003)	(.0028)	(.0002)	(.0003)	(0000)	(.0003)	(000.)	(0000)	(.001)
F Stats	1.60	2.93	2.46	0.35	0.88	4.19	3.70	5.94	1.33	0.56	0.81	0.32
$R^2$	.037	.064	.042	.007	.018	.077	.078	.111	.025	.012	.014	.007
# Obs.	2107	2107	2371	2373	2373	2373	2107	2107	2373	2373	2373	2373
State FE	$Y_{es}$	$Y_{es}$	$\gamma_{es}$	$Y_{es}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$Y_{es}$	$Y_{es}$	$Y_{es}$	$Y_{es}$	$Y_{es}$	$Y_{es}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$
edu, race, sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

edu, race, sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
O Chandand among which are achieved to betanod	mucates the	coefficients a	re significa	4111 at 10 /0,	a significanti at 10/0, 3/0 and 1/0 level re-	ever respect.	very.

Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.
 The numbers of observations are different due to missing data.

		Table A	4: R€	sults o	Table A.4: Results of 2SLS Models (Annual Growth)	Models	(Annua	al Grov	vth)			
		Economy			Lc	Local Market	št.			Income	ome	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	$_{ m Jobnf}$	$_{\mathrm{Jobf}}$	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age	$.0028^{**}$	$.0019^{*}$	.0001	0005	0281***	$.0013^{**}$	.001	0004	0008	.0008	0000.	0002
Std. Err.	(.0014)	(.001)	(.0011)	(.0008)	(.0078)	(0000)	(9000.)	(.0014)	(6000.)	(.0017)	(.0014)	(.0016)
1st-stage F Stats	68.06	68.06	76.81	77.20	77.20	77.20	68.06	68.06	77.20	77.20	77.20	77.20
$R^2$	.027	.056	.038	.006	000.	.047	.053	.106	.022	.008	600.	200.
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
Panel B												
Prime Age	406***	393***	073	.053	$6.134^{***}$	356***	342***	$.405^{***}$	150*	186	169	.226
Std. Err.	(.143)	(.106)	(.106)	(220.)	(.793)	(.054)	(.065)	(.138)	(.087)	(.159)	(.131)	(.139)
1st-stage F Stats	52.83	52.83	52.83	60.04	60.04	60.04	52.83	52.83	60.04	60.04	60.04	60.04
$R^2$	.021	.043	.039	.005	000.	.044	.040	660.	.022	.010	.010	.004
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
Panel C												
Old Dep.	$.002^{*}$	$.001^{*}$	000	000	023***	$.001^{***}$	$.001^{*}$	001	.000	.001	.001	000
Std. Err.	(.0012)	(.0008)	(2000.)	(9000)	(.0053)	(.0004)	(.0005)	(.0010)	(.0006)	(.0011)	(.0010)	(.0012)
1st-stage F Stats	61.47	61.47	57.64	59.27	59.27	61.47	61.47	59.27	59.27	59.27	59.27	
$R^2$	.021	.050	.038	.006	.000	.043	.054	.111	.023	.006	.005	200.
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
Panel D												
Over65	$.0039^{**}$	.0027*	0004	0008	0437***	$.002^{***}$	$.0014^{*}$	0023	.0001	.0010	.0013	0008
Std. Err.	(.0019)	(.0014)	(.0013)	(.0011)	(.0095)	(.0007)	(.0008)	(.0017)	(.0011)	(.0019)	(.0017)	(.0019)
1st-stage F Stats	67.94	67.94	67.94	65.47	67.38	67.38	67.38	67.94	67.94	67.38	67.38	67.38
$R^2$	.025	.053	.039	.006	.000	.043	.054	.110	.023	.008	.007	.007
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$
edu, race, sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. O Standard amount which are achieved to between control to the monotrol in momentation.	* indicates the	coefficients a	re significa	nt at 10%.	5% and 1%	level respec	tively.					

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Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.
 The numbers of observations are different due to missing data.

		Table	• A.5: ]	Results	of OL	Table A.5: Results of OLS Models (10-Year Growth)	els (10- <sup>7</sup>	Year G	rowth)			
		Economy			Γ	Local Market	et `			Inc	Income	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	$_{ m Jobnf}$	$_{\rm Jobf}$	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age	.005	.004	009**	0004		007***	007***	.002	.0005	0035	006***	003
Std. Err.	(.0038)	(.0038)	(.0046)	(.0016)	(.0118)	(.0020)	(.0021)	(.0047)	(.0025)	(.0026)	(.0020)	(.0023)
$R^2$	.346	346	.384	.222		549	529	.549	499	438	.465	411
# Obs.	256	261	261	256		261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel B												
Prime Age	.631	.740	.278	.041	676	.105	000	.718	.159	200.	028	009
Std. Err.	(.6076)	(.6430)	(.8103)	(.1709)	(1.9184)	(.2966)	(.3110)	(.6812)	(.3289)	(.4726)	(.3721)	(.3115)
$R^2$	.343	346	.374	.222	.319	.516	.491	.552	500	.431	.443	404
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel C												
Old Dep.	0005	0005	0052*	.0002	.0127	0022	0022	0034	0012	0034**	0033***	0027**
Std. Err.	(.0023)	(.0023)	(.0027)	(.0008)	(.0080)	(.0017)	(.0017)	(.0042)	(.0015)	(.0015)	(.0012)	(.0012)
$R^2$	.339	342	.381	.222	334	524	499	.553	501	.444	.456	414
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel D												
Over65	.0013	0002	$0111^{*}$	0005	.0243	0063**	0065**	0058	0023	0063**	0064***	0042
Std. Err.	(.0049)	(.0048)	(.0057)	(.0019)	(.0147)	(.0032)	(.0033)	(.0073)	(.0030)	(.0030)	(.0024)	(.0026)
$R^2$	.340	.341	.382	.222	.334	.533	.509	.552	.501	.443	.455	.411
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
State FE	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes
edu, race, sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes
Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively	*** indicates	the coefficient	s are signi	ficant at 10	0%, 5% and	1 1% level r	espectively.					
2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.	rors, which ar	e robust to he	teroskedasi	ficity, are r	enorted in	narenthesis						

Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.
 The numbers of observations are different due to missing data.

		Table A.6: Results of 2SLS Models (10-Year Growth)	i: Resu	ults of	2SLS N	Models	(10-Y)	ear Gr	owth)			
		Economy			Lo	Local Market	et )			Income	me	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	$_{ m Jobnf}$	$_{\rm Jobf}$	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age		.0070	.0112	0044	0125	0079	.0086	.0307	0112	0178	0169	.0190
Std. Err.		(.0297)	(.0464)	(.0095)	(.0830)	(.0203)	(.0222)	(.0387)	(.0177)	(.0278)	(.0212)	(.0278)
1st-stage F Stats		24.08	24.08	24.69	24.69	24.08	24.08	24.08	24.08	24.08	24.08	24.08
$R^2$		.344	.334	.174	.300	.389	.345	.413	.428	.330	.393	.051
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel B												
Prime Age		10.582	24.391	-4.256	-3.772	9.778	9.091	9.084	-2.788	0128	-2.063	4.733
Std. Err.		(23.07)	(50.80)	(8.456)	(26.29)	(19.39)	(18.22)	(22.61)	(9.952)	(9.161)	(8.420)	(12.43)
1st-stage F Stats		17.61	17.61	19.93	19.93	17.61	17.61	17.61	17.61	17.61	17.61	17.61
$R^2$		000.	000.	000.	.301	000.	000.	760.	.323	.431	.365	.000
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel C												
Old Dep.		010	0189	600.	0113	004	003	.003	000	008	001	.016
Std. Err.	<u> </u>	(.0232)	(.0348)	(.0110)	(.0590)	(.0135)	(.0143)	(.0319)	(.0134)	(.0162)	(.0158)	(0.0199)
1st-stage F Stats		17.00	17.00	15245	15245	17.00	17.00	17.00	17.00	17.00	17.00	17.00
$R^2$		.294	.332	000.	.275	.520	.498	.537	.500	.417	.449	.000
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel D												
Over65		034	057	.014	073	006	006	.035	011	027	008	.044
Std. Err.	-	(.081)	(.113)	(.028)	(.208)	(039)	(.042)	(.106)	(041)	(.056)	(.048)	(.069)
1st-stage F Stats		42.38	42.38	30.21	30.21	42.38	42.38	42.38	42.38	42.38	42.38	42.38
$R^2$		.198	.237	000.	.076	.533	.509	.398	.481	.313	.454	.000
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
State FE	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	$Y_{es}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$
edu, race, sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$
Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates	* indicates the	the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.	re significe	ant at $10\%$	, 5% and 1	% level re	spectively.					

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Note: 1. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis. 3. The numbers of observations are different due to missing data.

	$T_{a}$	Table A.7: Results of Time-Differenced OLS Models (Annual Growth)	Result	ts of Tin	ne-Differ	enced O	DLS Mo	dels (A	nnual G	Growth		
		Economy			Loc	Local Market				I	Income	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	$_{ m Jobnf}$	Jobf	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age	$.198^{***}$	$.092^{**}$	.041	133***	968**	057**	062**	130***	.108**	$.042^{***}$	$.054 * .223^{***}$	
Std. Err.	(0.0579)	(.0457)	(.0488)	(.0387)	(.4569)	(.0279)	(.0289)	(.0464)	(.0424)	(7060.)	(.0665)	(.0720)
$R^2$	.0407	.0639	.0416	.0137	.0107	.0788	0809	.1088	.0287	.0283	.0141	.0130
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
Panel B												
Prime Age	039	**260	.15***	.114***	$-2.639^{***}$	$.137^{***}$	$.014^{***}$	.016	.284***	$.804^{***}$	$.159^{**}$	$.134^{*}$
Std. Err.	(.0522)	(.0392)	(.0409)	(.0359)	(.3821)	(.0249)	(.0253)	(.0402)	(.0370)	(.0745)	(.0622)	(.0685)
$R^2$	.0341	.0648	.0470	.0129	.0442	0960	.0973	.1058	.0557	.0864	.0178	.0097
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
Panel C												
Old Dep.	$.104^{***}$	.025	029	069***	$-1.027^{***}$	$.039^{***}$	$.038^{**}$	060*	.003	.028	-009	016
Std. Err.	(.0390)	(.0368)	(.0387)	(.0230)	(.2235)	(.0144)	(.0153)	(.0347)	(.0251)	(.0514)	(.0420)	(.0404)
$R^2$	.0389	.0620	.0417	.0114	.0191	.0795	.0810	.1075	.0250	.0119	.0138	.0071
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
Panel D												
Over65	$.0911^{*}$	.0347	0280	0896***	$-1.1544^{***}$	$.0489^{***}$	$.0496^{***}$	0865**	.0222	0052	0096	0131
Std. Err.	(.0447)	(.0411)	(.0445)	(.0270)	(.0266)	(.0174)	(.0186)	(.0397)	(.0305)	(.0608)	(.0484)	(.0484)
$R^2$	.0365	.0622	.0416	.0126	.0178	0799	.0816	.1083	.0253	.0117	.0138	.0071
# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes
edu, race, sex	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note: 1. *, ** 2. Standard er	Note: 1. $*, **, ***$ indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.	the coefficient e robust to he	ts are sign teroskedas	ificant at 10 <sup>0</sup> ticity, are rel	6, 5% and 1% ported in pare	level respec nthesis.	tively.					
3. The numbe	. The numbers of observations are different	ons are differe.	nt due to	due to missing data.								

	Ta	Table A.8:	Results	Results of Time-Differenced OLS Models (10-Year Growth)	-Differe	nced O	LS Mod	dels (10	)-Year (	Growth)		
		$\mathbf{E}$ conomy			Loc	Local Market				Inco	Income	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	Jobnf	$_{\mathrm{Jobf}}$	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age	0713	-1.055*	-1.439**	2978***	0124	2483	2203	01157	5751**	0752	6022***	3339*
Std. Err.	(.5148)	(.5526)	(.6886)	(.0911)	(.6921)	(.1863)	(.1909)	(.2891)	(.2299)	(.2198)	(.2092)	(.2014)
$R^2$	.3672	.3956	.4279	.2802	.3177	5257	4989	.5487	.5362	.4316	4892	.4269
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel B												
Prime Age	.5588	.9355*	$1.473^{**}$	$.2881^{**}$	-3.069***	$.616^{***}$	$.6537^{***}$	6000	$.5261^{**}$	$1.0783^{***}$	$.5406^{**}$	.3515
Std. Err.	(.4570)	(.4875)	(.6365)	(.1119)	(.9644)	(.1904)	(.1947)	(.4990)	(.2445)	(.2709)	(.2406)	(.2151)
$R^2$	.0349	.3677	.4087	.2550	.3761	.5539	.5336	.5566	.5184	.5217	.4647	.4153
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel C												
Old Dep.	2558	3852*	6009**	1004***	.0041	1435*	1391*	$.2127^{*}$	1979**	0987	2698***	1757**
Std. Err.	(.1982)	(.2151)	(.2729)	(.0365)	(.2567)	(.0748)	(.0771)	(.1248)	(.0983)	(.0886)	(.0839)	(.0719)
$R^2$	.3664	.3965	.4457	.2718	.3177	.5414	.5149	.5610	.5327	.4395	.5150	.4402
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel D												
Over65	3790	5223*	8316**	1238***	0597	2149**	$2104^{**}$	.2999	2783**	1630	3428***	2429***
Std. Err.	(.2701)	(.2971)	(.3715)	(.0430)	(.3209)	(1090.)	(.1015)	(.1765)	(.1321)	(.1116)	(.1105)	(9060.)
$R^2$	.3783	.4075	.4636	.2717	.3179	.5533	.5267	.5646	.5423	.4461	.5190	.4493
# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
State FE	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes
edu, race, sex	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes
Note: 1. *, **, 2. Standard er	rors, which ar	Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.	teroskedastic	cant at 10%, city, are repo	5% and 1% rted in pare	level respec nthesis.	tively.					
o. I lie muine	IS OF ODSELVAUL	. I HE HUILIDERS OF ODSERVATIONS ARE UNREFERD QUE TO THISSING DATA.	III ane vo III.	Issing uata.								

	me	med25
Growth	Income	med16 med25
nnual (		average
els (A		Jobf
<b>2SLS Model</b>		$_{ m Jobnf}$
Ч	ocal Market	Jobtot
Difference	Local	$\mathbf{Unemp}$
lime-D		GDP   LFPR
I Jo S		GDP
9: Results of Time-D	Economy	per capita
Table A.9	I	per worker

per worker         per varker         per varker         per varker         for capita         GDP         LFPR         Unemp         Jobit         Jobf         Jobf         weige         medl6         med25 $870^{****}$ $544^{***}$ $350$ $-276$ $-4783^{***}$ $-0156$ $-1057$ $1167$ $11267$ $11267$ $1127$ </th <th>per worker         per worker         crapita         GDP         LFPR         Unemp         Jobtot         Jobt         Jobf         average         medl6           <math>370^{***}</math> <math>544^{***}</math> <math>544^{***}</math> <math>533</math> <math>-276</math> <math>4.753^{**}</math> <math>-0156</math> <math>-0292</math> <math>-437</math> <math>593^{***}</math> <math>11.67</math> <t< th=""><th></th><th></th><th>Economy</th><th></th><th></th><th>Ę</th><th>Local Market</th><th>ĩ</th><th></th><th></th><th>Income</th><th>me</th><th></th></t<></th>	per worker         per worker         crapita         GDP         LFPR         Unemp         Jobtot         Jobt         Jobf         average         medl6 $370^{***}$ $544^{***}$ $544^{***}$ $533$ $-276$ $4.753^{**}$ $-0156$ $-0292$ $-437$ $593^{***}$ $11.67$ <t< th=""><th></th><th></th><th>Economy</th><th></th><th></th><th>Ę</th><th>Local Market</th><th>ĩ</th><th></th><th></th><th>Income</th><th>me</th><th></th></t<>			Economy			Ę	Local Market	ĩ			Income	me	
**** $544^{***}$ $530$ $-276$ $-4763^{***}$ $-0156$ $-0292$ $-437$ $533^{****}$ $11.67$	* $870^{***}$ $544^{**}$ $350$ $276$ $-4.763^{**}$ $-0156$ $-0292$ $437$ $593^{***}$ Stats $(3306)$ $(.2244)$ $(.243)$ $(.190)$ $(2.120)$ $(.141)$ $(.132)$ $(.244)$ $(.217)$ Stats $13.42$ $11.67$ $11.67$ $11.67$ $11.67$ $(.147)$ $(.212)$ $(.147)$ $(.212)$ $(.141)$ $(.212)$ $(.146)$ $(.244)$ $(.212)$ $(.1167)$ $(.212)$ $(.132)$ $(.122)$ $(.137)$ $(.234)$ $.201$ $.2342$ $.2342$ $.2031$ $.2031$ $.2342$ $.2031$ $.2342$ $.2342$ $.2041$ $.2041$ $.2042$ $.2042$ $.2041$ $.2041$ $.2424$ $.2031$ $.2342$ $.2031$ $.2342$ $.2342$ $.2042$ $.2031$ $.2342$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2$		per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot		Jobf	average	med16	med25	mean
*** $544^{***}$ $350$ $276$ $4.763^{**}$ $0156$ $0292$ $437$ $593^{****}$ $1.125^{****}$ $743^{***}$ Stats $1167$ $1167$ $1167$ $1167$ $1167$ $1138$ $(217)$ $(380)$ $(328)$ Stats $1067$ $1146$ $1167$ $1167$ $1167$ $11367$ $(328)$ $(328)$ Stats $1067$ $1167$ $1167$ $1167$ $1167$ $(328)$ $(3217)$ $(328)$ $(328)$ Stats $1067$ $1126$ $1167$ $1167$ $1167$ $1278$ $1136$ $(166)$ $(122)$ $137$ $(231)$ $(234)$ $2342$	* $870^{***}$ $544^{**}$ $.350$ $.276$ $.4763^{**}$ $.0156$ $.0292$ $.437$ $.593^{***}$ Stats $1.342$ $1.167$ $1.167$ $1.1167$ $1.167$	Panel A												
Rats         (306)         (224)         (243)         (190)         (2120)         (141)         (1188)         (244)         (217)         (380)         (328)           Stats         13.42         11.67         1	Stats $(.306)$ $(.224)$ $(.244)$ $(.106)$ $(.1167)$ $(.111)$ $(.138)$ $(.244)$ $(.217)$ $21067$ $11.67$ $11.67$ $11.67$ $11.67$ $13.42$ $13.42$ $11.67$ $2342$	Median Age	.870***	$.544^{**}$	.350	276	$-4.763^{**}$	0156	0292	437	.593***	$1.125^{***}$	$.743^{**}$	.842***
Stats $13.42$ $11.67$ <th< td=""><td>Stats         13.42         13.42         11.67         11.67         11.67         11.67         13.42         13.42         11.67           2081         2081         2081         2340         5010         5205         5265         0930         4624           2081         2081         2342         2342         2342         2342         2081         2081         2342           1067         .1426         .1061         (.122)         (.132)         (.1536)         (.099)         (.100)         (.154)         (.156)           Stats         13.64         15.91         15.91         15.91         15.91         (.156)         (.156)           Stats         .0913         .0958         .1161         .4960         .5126         .5177         .0919         (.156)           .0923         .0913         .0958         .1161         .4960         .5126         .5177         .0919         .4629           Stats         .0535         .53.34         .1240         .1246         .1266         .177         .0919         .4629           Stats         .656***         .313         .1240         .1260         .1261         .1367         .1372</td><td>Std. Err.</td><td>(.306)</td><td>(.224)</td><td>(.243)</td><td>(.190)</td><td>(2.120)</td><td>(.141)</td><td>(.138)</td><td>(.244)</td><td>(.217)</td><td>(.380)</td><td>(.328)</td><td>(.315)</td></th<>	Stats         13.42         13.42         11.67         11.67         11.67         11.67         13.42         13.42         11.67           2081         2081         2081         2340         5010         5205         5265         0930         4624           2081         2081         2342         2342         2342         2342         2081         2081         2342           1067         .1426         .1061         (.122)         (.132)         (.1536)         (.099)         (.100)         (.154)         (.156)           Stats         13.64         15.91         15.91         15.91         15.91         (.156)         (.156)           Stats         .0913         .0958         .1161         .4960         .5126         .5177         .0919         (.156)           .0923         .0913         .0958         .1161         .4960         .5126         .5177         .0919         .4629           Stats         .0535         .53.34         .1240         .1246         .1266         .177         .0919         .4629           Stats         .656***         .313         .1240         .1260         .1261         .1367         .1372	Std. Err.	(.306)	(.224)	(.243)	(.190)	(2.120)	(.141)	(.138)	(.244)	(.217)	(.380)	(.328)	(.315)
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1st-stage F Stats	13.42	13.42	11.60	11.67	11.67	11.67	13.42	13.42	11.67	11.67	11.67	11.67
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$R^2$	.1067	.1426	.1061	.0834	.5010	.5205	.5265	.0930	.4624	.1278	.1137	.0001
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Panel B												
Stats         (.166)         (.122)         (.137)         (.123)<	Rates         (.166)         (.122)         (.137)         (.123)         (.1536)         (.099)         (.100)         (.154)         (.156)           Stats         13.64         15.91	Prime Age	0714	.207*	.347**	.259**	-7.959***	$.412^{***}$	$.416^{**}$	0883	.896***	$1.031^{***}$	$.443^{**}$	$.326^{*}$
Stats $13.64$ $13.64$ $15.91$ $1029$ 2081         2081         2081         2081         2081         2081         2081         2342 <t< td=""><td>Stats<math>13.64</math><math>15.91</math><math>15.91</math><math>15.91</math><math>13.64</math><math>13.64</math><math>13.64</math><math>15.91</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>20919</math><math>4629</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>213*</math><math>.656**</math><math>.391*</math><math>.1161</math><math>.4960</math><math>.5126</math><math>.5177</math><math>.0919</math><math>.4629</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>2312</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>51.3*</math><math>.656**</math><math>.391*</math><math>.126</math><math>.8.457**</math><math>.480***</math><math>.453***</math><math>123</math><math>.1691</math><math>5135</math><math>53.34</math><math>51.33</math><math>54.33</math><math>54.33</math><math>50.35</math><math>56.35</math><math>54.33</math><math>51035</math><math>50.35</math><math>53.34</math><math>54.33</math><math>54.33</math><math>50.35</math><math>54.33</math><math>.187</math><math>1107</math><math>.1001</math><math>.1240</math><math>.4623</math><math>.5236</math><math>.4968</math><math>.0001</math><math>.4325</math><math>2081</math><math>2081</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>2081</math><math>2342</math><math>2342</math><math>21.96</math><math>51.36</math><math>54.97</math><math>.1766</math><math>(.176)</math><math>(.177)</math><math>(.267)</math><math>(.267)</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.96</math><math>54.97</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.36</math><math>51.97</math><math>.0001</math><math>.2081</math><math>22342</math><math>22342</math><math>22342</math><math>22342</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.96</math><math>51.96</math><math>.51.96</math><math>.51.96</math><math>.51.96</math><math>.2999</math><math>51.96</math></td><td>Std. Err.</td><td>(.166)</td><td>(.122)</td><td>(.137)</td><td>(.123)</td><td>(1.536)</td><td>(660.)</td><td>(.100)</td><td>(.154)</td><td>(.156)</td><td>(.215)</td><td>(.195)</td><td>(.192)</td></t<>	Stats $13.64$ $15.91$ $15.91$ $15.91$ $13.64$ $13.64$ $13.64$ $15.91$ $2081$ $2081$ $2081$ $2081$ $20919$ $4629$ $2081$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $213*$ $.656**$ $.391*$ $.1161$ $.4960$ $.5126$ $.5177$ $.0919$ $.4629$ $2081$ $2081$ $2312$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $51.3*$ $.656**$ $.391*$ $.126$ $.8.457**$ $.480***$ $.453***$ $123$ $.1691$ $5135$ $53.34$ $51.33$ $54.33$ $54.33$ $50.35$ $56.35$ $54.33$ $51035$ $50.35$ $53.34$ $54.33$ $54.33$ $50.35$ $54.33$ $.187$ $1107$ $.1001$ $.1240$ $.4623$ $.5236$ $.4968$ $.0001$ $.4325$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2081$ $2342$ $2342$ $21.96$ $51.36$ $54.97$ $.1766$ $(.176)$ $(.177)$ $(.267)$ $(.267)$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $54.97$ $51.96$ $51.36$ $51.97$ $.0001$ $.2081$ $22342$ $22342$ $22342$ $22342$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $.51.96$ $.51.96$ $.51.96$ $.2999$ $51.96$	Std. Err.	(.166)	(.122)	(.137)	(.123)	(1.536)	(660.)	(.100)	(.154)	(.156)	(.215)	(.195)	(.192)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.023 $0.013$ $0.958$ $.1161$ $.4960$ $.5126$ $.5177$ $0.919$ $.4629$ $1C$ $.513*$ $.656***$ $.391*$ $.126$ $.8457***$ $.480***$ $.4629$ $.2342$ $.187$ $.1197$ $.1017$ $.0001$ $.1240$ $.4623$ $.52.36$ $.4968$ $.0001$ $.4325$ bs. $2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2342$ $.2342$ $.2342$ $.2342$ $.2342$ $.2342$ bs. $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2042$ $.2081$ $.2342$ bs. $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2160$	1st-stage F Stats	13.64	13.64	15.91	15.91	15.91	15.91	13.64	13.64	15.91	15.91	15.91	15.91
bs. 2081 2081 2340 2342 2342 2342 2081 2081 2342 2342 2342 2342 2342 2342 2342 10° 10° 10° 10° 10° 10° 10° 10° 10° 10°	bs. 2081 2081 2340 2342 2342 2342 2081 2081 2342 2342 2343 2342 16° 2342 16° 2342 16° 2343 16° 2343 16° 2563** 391* 1.26 $-8.457**$ $480***$ $453**$ $-123$ 1.87 Dep. 513* $(556**$ 391* $(126)$ $(143)$ $(143)$ $(1898)$ $(126)$ $(130)$ $(204)$ $(149)$ $(149)$ tage F Stats 50.35 50.35 53.34 54.33 54.33 50.35 50.35 54.33 tage 55.334 54.33 54.33 50.35 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 54.33 50.35 54.33 55.35 54.97 5001 4.399 bs. 2081 2081 20341 20341 20341 20341 20341 20341 20341 20342 2342 20381 20381 20342 2342 20381 20381 20340 2342 2342 2081 2081 2342 2081 2342 2081 2081 2342 2081 2081 2081 2342 2081 2081 2081 2083 12342 2081 2081 2342 2081 2081 2081 2342 2081 2081 2081 2081 2081 2081 2081 208	$R^2$	.0923	.0913	.0958	.1161	.4960	.5126	.5177	.0919	.4629	.1354	.1029	.0473
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Panel C												
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Err. $(.263)$ $(.218)$ $(.216)$ $(.130)$ $(.204)$ $(.149)$ $(.143)$ tage F Stats $50.35$ $50.35$ $53.34$ $54.33$ $54.33$ $50.35$ $50.35$ $54.33$ $54.32$ $5208$ $51.96$ $51.96$ $51.96$	Old Dep.	.513*	$.656^{***}$	$.391^{*}$	.126	-8.457***	$.480^{***}$	$.453^{***}$	123	.187	.526	.421	164
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Std. Err.	(.263)	(.218)	(.216)	(.143)	(1.898)	(.126)	(.130)	(.204)	(.149)	(.339)	(.265)	(.296)
bs.         .1107         .1107         .0001         .1240         .4623         .5236         .4968         .0001         .4325         .0001         .0547         54.97	b. $1107$ $.1107$ $.0001$ $.1240$ $.4623$ $.5236$ $.4968$ $.0001$ $.4325$ b. $2081$ $2081$ $2081$ $2340$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ b. $2342$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ $2342$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ b. $.389$ $.0001$ $.0318$ $.0516$ $-11.57**$ $.627***$ $.586***$ $223$ $.293$ b. $.3399$ $(.318)$ $(.313)$ $(.189)$ $(2.633)$ $(.176)$ $(.177)$ $(.267)$ $(.208)$ $.001$ b. $.2001$ $.0001$ $.0001$ $.0001$ $.2772$ $.4539$ $.51.96$ $51.96$ $54.97$ b. $.2081$ $2081$ $2340$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2081$ $2001$ $.4399$ b. $.2081$ $2081$ $2340$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ c. $.1765$ $.196$ $.51.96$ $.51.96$ $.51.96$ $.51.96$ $.54.97$ b. $.2081$ $2001$ $.0001$ $.0001$ $.2772$ $.4539$ $.5197$ $.0001$ $.4399$ b. $.2081$ $2081$ $2.342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2342$ $2081$ $2081$ $2342$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2342$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2342$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2081$ $.2342$ $.2081$ $.20$	1st-stage F Stats	50.35	50.35	53.34	54.33	54.33	54.33	50.35	50.35	54.33	54.33	54.33	54.33
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$R^2$	.1107	.1107	.0001	.1240	.4623	.5236	.4968	.0001	.4325	.0001	.0001	.0001
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Panel D												
F Stats 51.96 51.96 53.78 54.97 54.97 54.97 51.96 51.96 54.97 55.97 55.	F Stats 51.96 51.96 53.78 54.97 54.97 54.97 51.96 51.96 54.97 (.208) ( 0001 0001 0001 0001 0001 0001 0001 000	Over65	$.923^{**}$	$.993^{***}$	$.660^{**}$	.0516	$-11.57^{***}$	.627***	$.586^{***}$	223	.293	.510	.434	106
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Std. Err.	(.389)	(.318)	(.313)	(.189)	(2.633)	(.176)	(.177)	(.267)	(.208)	(.452)	(.343)	(.387)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1st-stage F Stats	51.96	51.96	53.78	54.97	54.97	54.97	51.96	51.96	54.97	54.97	54.97	54.97
2081         2081         2340         2342 <th< td=""><td>2081         2081         2340         2342         2342         2342         2081         2081         2342           Yes         Yes</td><td><math>R^2</math></td><td>.0001</td><td>.0001</td><td>.0001</td><td>.0001</td><td>.2772</td><td>.4539</td><td>.5197</td><td>.0001</td><td>.4399</td><td>.0001</td><td>.0547</td><td>.0001</td></th<>	2081         2081         2340         2342         2342         2342         2081         2081         2342           Yes	$R^2$	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.2772	.4539	.5197	.0001	.4399	.0001	.0547	.0001
Yes	Yes	# Obs.	2081	2081	2340	2342	2342	2342	2081	2081	2342	2342	2342	2342
Yes	Yes	State FE	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes
		edu, race, sex	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes

ta         GDP         LFPR         Unemp         Jobtot         Jobnf         Jobf         average           -7.323        460         -4.804         -3.374         -3.754 $2.047$ $417$ 0         (9.698)         (.822)         (10.230)         (4.686)         (5.159)         (5.021)         (1.922)           12.66         12.93         12.66         11.11         11.111         12.66 $4907$ 261         256         256         251         261         261         261         261           24.34         0.001         .0001         .0001         .0001         .0011         .0349           24.34         23.022         23.02         23.03         21.459         .12.43         20.74           24.34         23.074         23.175         (3.343)         (2.367)         .2.61         261           24.34         0.001         .0001         .0001         .001         .001         .0349           24.34         2.744         2.74         2.74         2.74         2.74           24.34         -1.255         -1.256         261         261         261         261 <td< th=""><th><math display="block"> \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c</math></th><th></th><th></th><th>Economy Local Market Incom</th><th></th><th></th><th>Lo</th><th>Local Market</th><th>et</th><th>/</th><th></th><th>Income</th><th>me</th><th></th></td<>	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$			Economy Local Market Incom			Lo	Local Market	et	/		Income	me	
$e_{1111}$ $-2.154$ $-3.675$ $-7.323$ $-460$ $-4.804$ $-3.374$ $-3.754$ $2.047$ $-417$ $:349$ $-1.110$ F Stats $11.28$ $11.11$ $12.66$ $12.330$ $(4.686)$ $(5.159)$ $(5.029)$ $(2.246)$ $(2.119)$ F Stats $11.28$ $11.11$ $12.66$ $12.93$ $12.66$ $12.61$ $261$ $261$ $261$ $261$ <td< th=""><th><math display="block"> \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc</math></th><th></th><th>per worker</th><th>per capita</th><th>GDP</th><th>LFPR</th><th>Unemp</th><th>Jobtot</th><th></th><th>Jobf</th><th>average</th><th>med16</th><th>med25</th><th>mean</th></td<>	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot		Jobf	average	med16	med25	mean
ge         -2.154         -3.675 $7.323$ -4.460 $4.804$ $3.374$ $3.774$ $2.713$ $(5.029)$ $(9.698)$ $(822)$ $(10.230)$ $(4.686)$ $(5.159)$ $(5.021)$ $(1.922)$ $(2246)$ $(2.119)$ F Stats $(11.28)$ $(12.33)$ $(2001)$ $0001$ $0001$ $0001$ $1.966$ $2.61$	$e^{-114}$ $3.675$ $-7323$ $-460$ $4.804$ $3.374$ $3.754$ $2.047$ $-417$ $349$ $-1.110$ F Stats $11.13$ $11.11$ $12.66$ $51.59$ $5.021$ $12.922$ $22.46$ $21.19$ F Stats $11.13$ $11.11$ $11.266$ $51.9$ $3.10$ $7.459$ $5.261$ $201$ $21.65$ $256$ $261$ $261$ $231$ $1.736$ $3.333$ $3.333$ $3.333$ $3.333$ $3.333$ $3.333$ $3.333$ $3.357$ F 547 $0.606$ $2001$ $2061$ $20$	Panel A												
F stats $(3.173)$ $(5.029)$ $(9.698)$ $(.822)$ $(10.230)$ $(4.686)$ $(5.159)$ $(5.021)$ $(1.922)$ $(2.246)$ $(2.119)$ $2068$ $2025$ $2001$ $3060$ $3000$ $3066$ $12.06$ $12.66$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Median Age	-2.154	-3.675	-7.323	460	-4.804	-3.374	-3.754	2.047	417	.349	-1.110	1.768
$ \begin{array}{l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l $	F Stats 11.28 11.11 12.66 12.33 12.93 12.66 11.11 11.11 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.66 12.61 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 2	Std. Err.	(3.173)	(5.029)	(9.698)	(.822)	(10.230)	(4.686)	(5.159)	(5.021)	(1.922)	(2.246)	(2.119)	(3.278)
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1st-stage F Stats	11.28	11.11	12.66	12.93	12.93	12.66	11.11	11.11	12.66	12.66	12.66	12.66
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$R^2$	.0698	.0225	.0001	.0060	.0001	.0001	.0001	.000	.0497	.0001	.1465	.0001
$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
$ \begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	$ \begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	Panel B												
$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	F Stats 19.16 20.74 24.34 23.02 23.02 24.34 20.74 20.74 24.33 (3.587) (3.5587) (3.558) (3.5587) (3.5597) (3.5597) (3.5597) (3.5597) (3.5597) (3.5597) (3.5597) (3.5578) (3.7597) (3.5597) (3.5597) (3.5578) (3.5774) (3.5714) (3.517) (3.5176) (3.517	Prime Age	2.393	-1.329	-3.450	-2.211	1.796	.519	.310	7.459	568	1.975	1.810	1.270
$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	F Stats 19.16 $20.74$ $24.34$ $23.02$ $23.02$ $23.02$ $24.34$ $20.74$ $20.74$ $24.34$ $24.34$ $24.34$ $24.34$ $24.34$ $256$ $0001$ $256$ $256$ $256$ $261$	Std. Err.	(4.547)	(6.525)	(10.50)	(2.712)	(10.03)	(3.175)	(3.343)	(12.24)	(3.634)	(3.333)	(3.587)	(3.170)
$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l $	1st-stage F Stats	19.16	20.74	24.34	23.02	23.02	24.34	20.74	20.74	24.34	24.34	24.34	24.34
$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$ \begin{array}{l c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	$R^2$	.0508	.0001	.2439	.0001	.0567	.1859	.1240	.0001	.0349	.1566	.0744	.0146
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Panel C												
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Old Dep.	2.619	.722	-1.474	-1.255	980	653	908	4.077	-1.252	1.219	320	.0648
ats 2.85 2.68 2.74 2.83 2.83 2.74 2.68 2.68 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74	ats 2.85 2.68 2.74 2.83 2.74 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74 2.74	Std. Err.	(6.998)	(2.795)	(3.275)	(2.917)	(8.553)	(1.779)	(2.173)	(8.126)	(2.867)	(3.050)	(1.353)	(1.406)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	1st-stage F Stats	2.85	2.68	2.74	2.83	2.83	2.74	2.68	2.68	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.74
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$R^2$	.0001	.0001	.0001	.000	.0001	.0001	.0001	.000	.000	.0001	.1505	.0001
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Panel D												
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Over65	-2.683	-1.145	.901	1.116	1.052	1.018	1.205	-2.239	1.367	-1.462	.189	.153
ats $3.97$ $4.21$ $4.71$ $4.66$ $4.66$ $4.71$ $4.21$ $4.21$ $4.7$	ats $3.97$ $4.21$ $4.71$ $4.66$ $4.66$ $4.71$ $4.21$ $4.21$ $4.7$	Std. Err.	(4.849)	(2.483)	(3.941)	(2.560)	(7.189)	(2.710)	(3.101)	(6.301)	(3.224)	(3.075)	(1.557)	(1.582)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	1st-stage F Stats	3.97	4.21	4.71	4.66	4.66	4.71	4.21	4.21	4.71	4.71	4.71	4.71
256         261         261         256         256         261 <td><math display="block"> \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc</math></td> <td><math>R^2</math></td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.000</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td> <td>.0001</td>	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$R^2$	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.000	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001
Yes	Yes     Yes <td># Obs.</td> <td>256</td> <td>261</td> <td>261</td> <td>256</td> <td>256</td> <td>261</td> <td>261</td> <td>261</td> <td>261</td> <td>261</td> <td>261</td> <td>261</td>	# Obs.	256	261	261	256	256	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Yes	Yes         Yes <td>State FE</td> <td><math>\gamma_{es}</math></td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td> <td><math>\gamma_{es}</math></td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td> <td>Yes</td>	State FE	$\gamma_{es}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\gamma_{es}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors. which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.	edu, race, sex	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

		Table .	Table A.11: Results of OLS Models (Before Recession)	esults	of OLS	Model	s (Befo	re Rece	ession)			
		$\mathbf{Economy}$			Г	Local Market	cet .			Inco	Income	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	$_{ m Jobnf}$	Jobf	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age	0000.	0006	0028***	0006	$.0110^{*}$	0008**	0007**	.0011	0006	0001	0012	0014
Std. Err.	(.0016)	(.0011)	(.0010)	(6000.)	(.0057)	(.0003)	(.0003)	(.0018)	(9000)	(.0015)	(.0015)	(.0013)
$R^{2}$	.253	.336	416	.184	.363	.491	471	542	.391	.276	.257	.162
# Obs.	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel B												
Prime Age	.2337	.1298	.0040	0406	.3784	.0561	.0461	$.5465^{**}$	0304	.3222	$.4685^{**}$	.0510
Std. Err.	(.1655)	(.1368)	(.1432)	(70897)	(.9084)	(.0641)	(.0641)	(.2759)	(.0645)	(.2372)	(.2068)	(.1941)
$R^2$	.259	.338	.384	.182	.350	.478	.459	.556	.387	.284	.276	.158
# Obs.	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel C												
Old Dep.	0011	0010	$0016^{***}$	.0001	$.0068^{**}$	0004**	0003**	0022	0005	0015	0024***	0009
Std. Err.	(.2597)	(.3456)	(.4056)	(.1820)	(.3604)	(.4839)	(.4625)	(.5535)	(.3931)	(.2850)	(.2858)	(.1616)
$R^2$	.260	.346	.406	.182	.360	.484	.463	.554	.393	.285	.286	.162
# Obs.	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
Panel D												
Over 65	0016	0017	0032***	.000	$.0124^{**}$	0009**	0008**	0033	0010	0023	0042**	0016
Std. Err.	(.0020)	(.0013)	(.0012)	(.0011)	(.0068)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0029)	(.0008)	(.0019)	(.0020)	(.0015)
$R^2$	.257	343	407	.182	359	486	465	548	394	.282	.281	.161
# Obs.	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	261
State FE	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$Y_{es}$	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$
edu, race, sex	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes
Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.	*** indicates	the coefficient	s are signific	sant at $10^{\circ}$	6, 5% and	1% level res	spectively.					
2. Standard er	rors, which ar	. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.	teroskedastic	city, are ret	orted in pa	arenthesis.	2					

The numbers of observations are different due to missing data. ŝ

Cable A.12: Results of OLS Models (During Recession)         Income	Jobnf Jobf average med		$.00300008^{***}0011^{***} .0001  0011^{*}00040009$	(.0050) $(.0003)$ $(.0003)$ $(.0006)$ $(.0006)$ $(.0012)$ $($	.030 $.217$ $.251$ $.058$ $.040$ $.040$ $.028$	791 791 791 791 791		.114237077*079* .010  090004 .023		033 030 210 203 251 056 0400 039	791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791		.00310004**0006**0003  0007*00040007	(.0004) (.0036) (.0002) (.0002) (.0004) (.0004) (.0009) (.0008) (.0007)	.031 .211 .208 .252 .057 .040 .041	791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791		$.00590009^{**}0012^{***}0005  001200080011$	(.0004) $(.0008)$ $(.0008)$ $(.0008)$ $(.0016)$ $(.0014)$	031 213 210 252 057 040 040	791 791 791 791 791	Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes	Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes	Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.
uring I				-					Ŭ										_					ively.
Iodels (L Market			·										'											% level respect enthesis.
of OLS N													'									Yes	Yes	%, 5% and 1 <sup>9</sup> ported in par
esults c	LFPR		0004	(.0005)	.030	791		.114	(.0738)	.033	791		0006	(.0004)	.033	791		0011	(000.)	.033	791	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	ficant at 10 ticity, are re
A.12: R	GDP		0013*	(.0008)	.084	790		240**	(.1009)	.086	790		0005	(.0005)	.081	790		0010	(.0010)	.081	790	$\gamma_{es}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	its are signi eteroskedasi
Table A	per capita		0000.	(2000.)	.088	791		224**	(.0920)	.095	791		.0003	(.0005)	.089	791		0000.	(6000.)	.089	791	$Y_{es}$	Yes	
-	per worker		.0006	(.0008)	.054	791		331***	(.1118)	.063	791		6000.	(2000)	.057	791		$.0019^{*}$	(.0012)	.057	791	Yes	Yes	*** indicates - prs, which are
		Panel A	Median Age	Std. Err.	$R^2$	# Obs.	Panel B	Prime Age	Std. Err.	$R^2$	# Obs.	Panel C	Old Dep.	Std. Err.	$R^2$	# Obs.	Panel D	Over65	Std. Err.	$R^2$	# Obs.	State FE	edu, race, sex	Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the 2. Standard errors, which are rol

		Table	A.13: 1	Results	of OLS	Model	Table A.13: Results of OLS Models (After Recession)	Reces	sion)			
		Economy			Γ	Local Marke	et `			Income	me	
	per worker	per capita	GDP	LFPR	Unemp	Jobtot	$_{ m Jobnf}$	$_{\rm Jobf}$	average	med16	med25	mean
Panel A												
Median Age	*000.	**9000.	0002	0003	0040**	0003**	0004**	0004	0001	0005	0002	.0004
Std. Err.	(.0005)	(.0003)	(.0003)	(.0003)	(.0016)	(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0005)	(.0002)	(2000.)	(0000)	(8000.)
$R^2$	.0867	.1503	0960.	.0154	.0349	.2303	.2350	.1396	0504	.0171	.0179	.0125
# Obs.	1055	1055	1320	1321	1321	1321	1055	1055	1321	1321	1321	1321
Panel B												
Prime Age	$.135^{**}$	$.138^{***}$	$.142^{***}$	003	.344	.067***	.088***	200.	$.103^{***}$	108	031	.044
Std. Err.	(0000)	(.0413)	(.0408)	(.0402)	(.2396)	(.0175)	(.0202)	(.0588)	(.0376)	(.0861)	(.0736)	(.1139)
$R^2$	.0880	.1547	.1026	.0144	.0317	.2354	.2441	.1389	.0559	.0178	.0180	.0124
# Obs.	1055	1055	1320	1321	1321	1321	1055	1055	1321	1321	1321	1321
Panel C												
Old Dep.	.0003	.0002	0002	0002	0028**	0001	0002*	0003	0000	.0001	.0001	.0003
Std. Err.	(.0004)	(.0002)	(.0002)	(.0002)	(.0011)	(.0001)	(.0001)	(.0004)	(.0002)	(0005)	(.0004)	(.0010)
$R^2$	.0843	.1466	0960.	.0152	.0346	.2272	.2322	.1397	.0502	.0166	.0179	.0127
# Obs.	1055	1055	1320	1321	1321	1321	1055	1055	1321	1321	1321	1321
Panel D												
Over65	.0006	.0004	0006	0004	0059***	0004**	0006***	0006	0001	.0003	.0002	.0005
Std. Err.	(2000.)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0004)	(.0022)	(.0002)	(.0002)	(2000.)	(.0003)	(6000.)	(.0008)	(.0016)
$R^2$	.0844	.1468	0260.	.0152	.0355	.2305	.2375	.1397	.0503	.0167	.0179	.0125
# Obs.	1055	1055	1320	1321	1321	1321	1055	1055	1321	1321	1321	1321
State FE	Yes	Yes	$\gamma_{es}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\gamma_{es}$	Yes	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes
edu, race, sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	$\mathbf{Yes}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level r. 2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis.	*** indicates rors, which are	Note: 1. *, **, *** indicates the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parenthesis. 3. The number of sheavertions are different for to missing data.	teroskedast	ficant at 10 licity, are re	%, 5% and sported in p	1% level res arenthesis.	pectively.					
O. THE HUIDE	TOPA TOPATO TO C.		TTO AND AT	onen gitteetti								





Figure A.2: Coefficients of Age Structures in Quantile Regressions using GDP as Dependent Variables (Annual Growth)

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Figure A.3: Coefficients of Age Structures in Quantile Regressions using GDP as Dependent Variables (10-Year Growth)






Figure A.5: Coefficients of Age Structures in Quantile Regressions using Unemployment Rates as Dependent Variables (10-Year Growth)

